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 ABSTRACT 
Amidst multiple reinforcing social and ecological crises dominant development 
agencies are discursively shifting the place and role of agriculture from the periphery 
to the center of the development agenda.  While development discourse is touting the 
role of smallholder agriculture in supporting development processes and 
multifunctional agriculture to meet sustainability objectives, the different framings of 
problems and solutions between the World Development Report 2008 (World Bank 
2008) and the International Assessment of Agriculture Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD 2008) are exposing contradictions and tensions within 
dominant development discourse.  This thesis explores the ways in which the re-
framing of agriculture as a response to food, energy, and climate crises is being 
constituted within and external to development discourses, and the potentials for an 
alternative development.  I argue that we are, indeed, in a moment of transition in 
which the epistemic tensions within development discourse are providing space for a 
radical shift in how agriculture is conceptualized (and practiced) vis-à-vis food, 
energy, and climate crises, providing an opportunity for social movements advocating 
food and fuel sovereignty to flourish within the interstices of the competing visions of 
agriculture in development discourse.  In conclusion, I explore how the discursive and 
political interventions of the food sovereignty movement, in a moment of declining 
confidence in agro-industrial food and energy systems, is reformulating the original 
agrarian question and establishing food sovereignty as the basis for development 
alternatives.  In this transitional moment agrarian social movements are reclaiming the 
political subjectivity of peasant agriculture grounded on the social and ecological 
benefits of peasant agrecological practices and knowledges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
By 2008, the culmination of food, energy, and climate crises exposed 
vulnerabilities in the global food economy and shortcomings of dominant 
development discourse and practice, in which agriculture has been subordinated to 
industrial development.  Although concerns over food, energy, and climate have been 
building for decades, the shocking reality that over one billion people suffered from 
chronic hunger in 2009 has forced a reframing of agriculture and development.  Once 
a neglected aspect of the development industry, agriculture is taking center stage 
within dominant development discourse and international reports. 
The convergence and magnitude of these interrelated crises has provoked cracks 
and fissures in the development agenda, as evidenced by the nearly simultaneous 
publication of two international reports produced by key development institutions – 
the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for 
Development Report (IAASTD) and the 2008 World Development Report (WDR1).  
These two reports are chosen largely on the basis of their influence on development 
discourse and practice.  As the world’s largest development lending institution, the 
World Bank (author of the WDR) plays a pivotal role in setting the mainstream 
development agenda.  The IAASTD is sponsored by a prominent group of 
development institutions, including the UN Environment Program, Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and Development Program; UNESCO; Global Environment 
Facility; and (ironically) the World Bank.2  As one of the largest and most thorough 
assessments of global agriculture, involving more than four years of research from 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise specified, the acronym “WDR” refers to the World Development Report 2008. 
2 Ironically, though a funder of the IAASTD, the World Bank neglects its findings, particularly those 
that compete with or challenge economistic logic embedded in an agro-industrial episteme.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, the inner politics of this irony will not be explored and these reports will be 
treated as two diverging epistemic positions on the role of agriculture in development in a moment of 
food, energy, and climate crises. 
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over 400 experts, the findings and conclusions of the IAASTD will be a prominent 
feature in contemporary development debates, and it serves as a strong counterpoint to 
the WDR within dominant development agencies (Ishii-Eiteman and Ching 2008).  
Reflective in both of these reports is the discursive re-framing of agriculture vis-à-
vis development and contemporary social and ecological crises.  Whereas previous 
development discourse framed small-scale farmers as obstacles to capital 
accumulation and agricultural sectors as the servant to national industrial 
development, the culmination of food, energy, and climate crises are provoking a re-
thinking of the role and place of smallholder agriculture.  Once peripheral (and an 
impediment) to development, agriculture is being re-envisioned as a potential engine 
for economic growth and as the solution to ecological and energy crises.  The WDR 
and the IAASTD present two competing framings of contemporary crises as well as 
conflicting visions for the future of smallholder farmers in relation to development and 
these crises.   
For the WDR, the re-framing of agriculture assumes the inefficiency of 
smallholder agriculture and thus recommends the consolidation of industrial 
agriculture through global market integration and increased productivity via 
technological innovation.  The WDR’s argument for the potential of agriculture to 
meet energy and ecological demands while simultaneously supporting economic 
growth, reproduce anew the historical trend of subordinating agriculture to capital and 
reinforce historically constituted unequal and uneven power relations between the 
global North and South.  Reframing these crises as Malthusian dilemmas where 
population growth and diminishing natural resources require technological 
interventions in the global South to maximize yields and adapt to climate change, the 
WDR sanctions the biotechnology industry and the corporate food regime strategies of 
commercializing smallholder agriculture. 
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In contrast to the WDR’s advocacy of an agribusiness-led agrarian transformation, 
the IAASTD poses an epistemic alternative, problematizing industrial agriculture and 
focusing on the displacement of small-scale farmers and embedded knowledges as a 
central aspect of contemporary crises.  Though the IAASTD does not challenge 
“development” itself, it views the negative consequences of the green revolution 
model of agro-industrialization – soil erosion, water contamination/scarcity, 
population displacement, increased fossil fuel consumption, etc. – as greater than the 
purported productivity gains.  The IAASTD calls for a radical rethinking of 
agriculture, which does not abandon market integration or technological innovation, 
but is focused on maintaining small-holder farms and preserving and building off of 
place-based traditional knowledges.   
One of the key areas in which the epistemic tensions in the WDR and IAASTD are 
most evident is in their assessment of biotechnology as a ‘solution’ to the food, 
energy, and climate crises and their conceptions of multifunctionality and smallholder 
farmers.  In addition to the WDR’s support of biotechnology as an avenue for 
sustainable development, the WDR’s “agriculture for development” agenda promotes 
a market-based approach to food security that undermines food sovereignty.3  This 
approach to agriculture and development strengthens the corporate food regime by 
promoting a privatized notion of agricultural multifunctionality that paradoxically 
exacerbates energy, food, and climate crises by extending the agro-industrial model of 
production, expanding commodity relations, and displacing locally situated 
                                                
3 The ‘food sovereignty’ movement contrasts with the notion of ‘food security.’  Food Security in its 
most common use is the ‘human right to sufficient food’.  Nationally, food security is no longer 
premised on a notion of food self-sufficiency, but generally on the right to predictable food sources.  As 
a legal concept food security is largely based on the right to food markets and food imports.  When 
countries lack the currency to import food, humanitarian food aid provides a ‘safety net’.  In contrast, 
food sovereignty is based on the political rights of people, communities, and countries to own and 
control the productive means to meet their food needs.  Although the concept of food sovereignty is not 
opposed to trade, it challenges the notion of free markets and calls on governments to protect the right 
of farmers (Lee 2007, Rosset 2003, McMichael 2004).  These ideas will be expanded upon in Chapter 
Three. 
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knowledges.  Alternatively, the IAASTD interprets multifunctionality in agriculture 
such that local and traditional knowledge among smallholder farmers plays a central 
role in meeting the multiple needs of communities and ecosystems.  The challenges to 
unrestrained acceptance and implementation of biotechnology and market integration 
posed by the IAASTD reflect epistemic tensions and critical disjunctures in 
programmatic assessment and policy prescriptions in development discourse and 
practice. 
I argue that the epistemic tension within development discourse is reflective of the 
tenuousness of the current agro-industrial paradigm, signaling the possibility for a 
politics of emergence in which food and fuel sovereignty movements may consolidate 
as viable development alternatives.  The IAASTD’s challenge to dominant 
development discourse lends legitimacy to food and fuel sovereignty movements’ 
attempts to revalorize smallholder agriculture and local knowledge and to subordinate 
marketization and technological innovations to social and ecological justice and 
sustainability.  This paper argues that we are, indeed, in a moment of transition in 
which the epistemic tensions within development discourse are providing space for a 
radical shift in how agriculture is conceptualized (and practiced) vis-à-vis food, 
energy, and climate crises, providing an opportunity for social movements advocating 
food and fuel sovereignty to flourish within the interstices of the competing visions of 
agriculture in development discourse. 
 
ORGANIZATION 
This thesis explores the ways in which the re-framing of agriculture as a response 
to food, energy, and climate crises is being constituted within and external to 
development discourses.  Chapter 1 investigates the distinctive ways in which the 
WDR and the IAASTD have interpreted and assessed the crises and reframed the role 
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of agriculture in development.  The WDR’s emphasis on market failures, Malthusian 
framing, and a lack of ‘development’ as the underlying causes of these crises contrasts 
starkly with the IAASTD’s more complex problematization of the agro-industrial 
model and its negative consequences.  This chapter examines the characteristics, 
assumptions, and interests at stake in the reframing of agriculture at this historical 
conjuncture, arguing that the divergent perspectives of the WDR and the IAASTD 
constitute an epistemic conflict within development discourse. 
Chapter 2 examines how the WDR and the IAASTD envision solutions to food, 
energy, and climate crises.  Focusing specifically on the role of biotechnology, this 
chapter examines central epistemic differences in conceptualizations of the place and 
purpose of biotechnologies, approach to market-oriented agriculture and agri-business, 
understandings of multifunctionality, views of small-holder farms, and systems of 
valuation.  The WDR’s emphasis on corporate-driven economic development 
undermines its stated goals of reducing smallholder poverty and supporting 
sustainable agriculture (specifically harnessing the multiple functions of agriculture to 
promote food, energy and climate security).  In doing so, the WDR reproduces 
modernist assumptions of development, which presume the death of the peasantry and 
espouse the productive efficiencies of agribusiness as a vehicle for ‘sustainable’ 
economic growth.  In contrast, the IAASTD takes a much more cautious approach to 
biotechnology.  Here, biotechnological application is considered appropriate to the 
extent that it promotes the viability of agroecological alternatives, the promotion of 
smallholder farms, and the integration and reproduction of embedded knowledges. 
Chapter 3 provides an illustration of the practical extensions of these diverging 
epistemes where the material and discursive struggles over the role of smallholder 
agriculture in development expose the features of contemporary global double 
movement  (Polanyi 2001).  I argue that development discourse and corporate agrofuel 
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projects are converging around a green development agenda that hinges on corporate 
managed multifunctional agriculture.  This development agenda expresses the 
disembedding side of Polanyi’s double movement on a global scale by transforming 
and subordinating embedded ecological relations to global commodity relations.  
However, the contrasting conception of multifunctionality presented in the IAASTD 
reveals cracks within dominant development discourse through which agrarian social 
movements are challenging the legitimacy of the corporate food regime and 
consolidating a transnational protective movement.  Competing paradigms of 
multifunctionality and agrarian development (agro-industrial and food sovereignty) 
expressed within this global double movement crystallize the tensions of a transitional 
moment (Friedmann 2005, McMichael 2009c). 
On one hand, the corporate food regime is consolidating its power under the 
premises of ‘green capitalist development’ as endorsed by the WDR’s agriculture for 
development agenda.  The reproduction of the dominant development model is 
epitomized by the current corporate-led agrofuel expansion as a solution to energy and 
climate crises.  The emphasis on agrofuels illustrates the ways in which the corporate 
food regime is exploiting technological and market-based responses to social and 
ecological crises to strengthen the corporate control of food and fuel systems.  On the 
other hand, the epistemic tensions illustrated in the WDR and IAASTD reflect 
emerging challenges to the agro-industrial model within development discourse and an 
opportunity for agrarian social movements to establish the centrality of smallholder 
agroecological knowledges and practices in addressing social and ecological crises.  
The challenge to the dominant development model, reflected in the IAASTD, and the 
ecological contradictions of corporate agrofuel projects represent declining confidence 
in agro-industrial food and energy systems, providing the opportunity for development 
alternatives to consolidate at the interstices of these cracks and fissures (Friedmann 
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2005).  These opportunities are evident in the food sovereignty movement, as 
illustrated by the transnational peasant federation La Via Campesina (McMichael 
2006, 2008).  
In conclusion, I explore how the discursive and political interventions of the food 
sovereignty movement, in a moment of declining confidence in agro-industrial food 
and energy systems, is reformulating the original agrarian question and establishing 
food sovereignty as the basis for development alternatives.  This moment of potential 
transition implies a re-framing of the agrarian question in which agrarian social 
movements are reclaiming the political subjectivity of peasant agriculture grounded on 
the social and ecological benefits of peasant agrecological practices and knowledges.  
Whereas the food and fuel complex reflect a marketized conception of agricultural 
multifunctionality that disembedds agriculture from its social and ecological 
foundations (thus reproducing socio-ecological crises), La Via Campesina and the 
food sovereignty movement express a transnational countermovement premised on 
smallholder multifunctionality embedded in local agroecological knowledges and 
practices that restore and protect social and ecological sustainability. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RESPONDING TO THE CRISES: RE-FRAMING AGRICULTURE IN 
DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE 
 
Nothing obscures our social vision as effectively as the economistic 
prejudice.  (Polanyi 2001: 166) 
 
 This chapter provides a discursive analysis of the ways in which the WDR and 
IAASTD frame agriculture in relation to food, energy, and climate crises.  Before 
embarking on this analysis, I describe the characteristics of these three contemporary 
crises.  I then explain how the WDR frames these crises and the role of agriculture and 
development therein.  Next, I contrast the WDR’s framings with those of the 
IAASTD, followed by a discussion of the implications of these divergent perspectives 
and the significance of the ways in which these issues are framed.   Central to the 
framing of agriculture and development is how value is constructed, who decides what 
is valued, and by what measure, and lastly, what forms of knowledge is counted.  It is 
argued here that the discursive framings of the WDR and IAASTD expose divergent 
and conflicting valuation systems and reflect epistemic tensions in the dominant 
development paradigm.  While the WDR reproduces the agro-industrial model through 
modernist and ahistorical assumptions of development that depoliticize the causes of 
crises, the IAASTD problematizes the agro-industrial model, arguing for an approach 
to agriculture that privileges local knowledges and subordinates market-oriented 
agriculture to food security and ecological sustainability. 
 
SETTING THE STAGE: INTERLOCKING CRISES OF THE NEOLIBERAL 
CONJUNCTURE  
In the opening speech of the World Food Conference in 1974, Henry Kissinger 
proclaimed “within a decade no man, woman or child will go to bed hungry.”  
However, despite increased rhetorical and financial efforts of OECD countries to 
reduce food insecurity in the global South over the past three decades (mainly through 
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Structural Adjustment loans and food aid), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) calculates that in 2009 over 1 billion people suffered from hunger (2009).  
Between 2005 and 2009, and especially during the final months of 2007, the world 
witnessed unprecedented food inflation.  The Economist food price index increased by 
75% between 2005 and 2007, reaching its highest price since it was initiated in 1845.  
By 2008 maize prices doubled, rice increased by 70%, wheat by 50%, soy was up 
60%, and cooking oil prices rose precipitously (Magdoff 2008, Holt-Gimenez 2008).  
As a result of skyrocketing prices and a lack of social safety nets (a casualty of 
neoliberal restructuring), people took to the streets instigating riots in over 30 
countries, including Mexico, Egypt, Mozambique, Haiti, Indonesia, and Pakistan 
(Bello 2008; Holt-Gimenez, Patel, and Shattuck 2009).  The food import bill in the 
global South grew by 30% in 2006, and an additional 37% in 2007 (Bello 2008). 
This period of food inflation developed concurrently with the mutually constitutive 
problem of rising energy costs.  While energy prices gradually rose over the first 
decade of the new millennium, the price of oil spiked between 2006 and 2008, 
destabilizing energy security in many countries in the global South and raising the cost 
of agro-inputs.  Consequently, farmers dependent on agro-inputs were subject to the 
price setting of agro-input corporations (whom, according to GRAIN 2008a, increased 
prices far greater than increases in energy prices), rising transportation costs 
exacerbated food prices, and rising costs of food, oil, and agro-chemical imports 
further indebted countries dependent on these imports.  Another effect of high energy 
and food costs was that agro-input corporations and grain traders were able to 
maintain record profits at the expense of both farmers (through higher production 
costs) and consumers (in higher food prices) (GRAIN 2008a).  Likewise, it spurred a 
concerted effort by agribusiness and industrialized countries to support and expand the 
production of agrofuels as an alternative energy source, yet these projects largely 
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exacerbated both food and climate crises without any significant energy gains.4  
According to the World Watch Institute, the era of cheap and abundant oil is quickly 
coming to a close as global demand for energy has been growing on a per-capita basis 
since 1981 (Brown 2006).  Oil extraction has exceeded oil discoveries at an increasing 
rate since the 1980s.  For example, in 2008, 31 billion barrels of oil were extracted 
from the earth while only 9 billion were discovered (Ibid).  Of the 2 trillion barrels of 
oil discovered globally, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that over 1 
trillion barrels have been consumed (Klare 2008).  The first trillion barrels of oil were 
relatively easy to access and extract, according to Michael Klare, but the next trillion 
barrels will require more energy and capital-intensive processes to extract (2008).  
While both the food and energy crises represent serious threats to human survival, 
climate change has taken center stage as the defining global ecological crisis of 
contemporary times.5  In the words of the 2007/2008 Human Development Report, 
“climate change is the defining human development issue of our generation” (quoted 
in McMichael 2009a: 248).  According to the ‘poverty and climate change’ report of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC), climate 
change “is a serious risk to poverty reduction and threatens to undo decades of 
development efforts” (Ibid: 248).  Agriculture is central to climate change as it is both 
a contributor to (mainly from land use change and intensive agricultural practices) and 
victim of global climate change (due to more variable weather conditions, especially 
in relation to water availability).  Although estimates vary, the IPCC cautiously 
calculates that agriculture contributes 10-12% of global greenhouse gas emissions 
                                                
4 See Pimentel (2009a) for a break down of the energy balance of various agrofuels (that is, how much 
energy it takes to produce feedstocks and convert to fuel as compared to the amount of energy obtained 
through fuel combustion.) 
5 While climate variability poses a serious threat to rain fed agriculture, the affects of climate change on 
water availability may be the most important factor.  Agriculture accounts for 69% freshwater 
consumption and is the source of 70% of water contamination (Brown 2006; McNeill 2001).   
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(GHG), and 60% of N2O and 50% of CH4 (Smith et al 2007).  When land use change 
and food transportation, processing, and preparation are taken into account, industrial 
agrofood systems account for around a quarter of all GHG emissions.  According to 
the IPCC, agricultural emissions of CH4 and N2O globally rose by 17% between 
1990-2005, and within this century, they project that average global temperatures will 
rise between 4 and 6°C with catastrophic effects on coastal areas, water resources, 
agriculture, and people who make their livelihoods from functioning ecosystems 
(Ibid).  Historically constituted relations of consumption and exploitation define the 
ecological debt between the global North and South.  For example, while the “North 
accounts for 80% of CO2 build up in the atmosphere”, the burden of climate change 
will disproportionately affect the global South (McMichael 2009a: 248). 
Whereas the intertwining of fossil fuel consumption and industrial agriculture on 
one hand worsens climate change, climate change in turn threatens to undermine the 
biological conditions of production in many areas of the world, especially coastal 
areas and regions under water stress.  This predicament is precisely why agriculture 
has received renewed attention in development discourse in this historical moment.  
Both the WDR and IAASTD recognize the interconnections between agriculture and 
these crises, reflected in the conceptual shift in both reports: once marginalized to the 
periphery, agriculture is now at the center of the development agenda.  In addition, 
both reports emphasize the multifunctionality of agriculture to meet food and energy 
needs and to ensure ecological sustainability.  However, the ways in which the two 
reports interpret these interconnections reflect diverging epistemes, the configuration 
of which is the focus of the following sections. 
12 
RESPONDING TO THE CRISES: THE WDR AND THE “AGRICULTURE FOR 
DEVELOPMENT” AGENDA 
Historically, agriculture has played a peripheral role in the World Bank’s approach 
to development.  The World Bank’s first two and a half decades did not focus on 
agriculture at all; loans were primarily granted for infrastructure projects in 
moderately affluent countries (Goldman 2005).  It wasn’t until the 1970’s that the 
World Bank, under the guidance of Robert McNamara, turned towards the goals of 
“poverty alleviation” through promoting agriculture and rural development (ibid).  In 
his own words, McNamara referred to agriculture as the “stepchild of development” 
(1973; quoted in Goldman 2005: 70).  In the 1970s the World Bank’s strategy for rural 
development and poverty alleviation focused on modernizing smallholder agriculture 
via green revolution technological packages including state-based promotion of 
synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, hybrid seeds, and irrigation systems.  Despite the 
World Bank’s discourse of reducing poverty through promoting agriculture, the green 
revolution strategy of agricultural development was premised on maximizing the 
productive efficiency of large-scale industrial agriculture and thus moving inefficient 
farmers out of the countryside.  Far from reducing poverty, green revolution projects 
exacerbated inequalities, consolidating lands in the hands of wealthy farmers and 
displacing or marginalizing peasant farmers (Araghi 2000).  Furthermore, the World 
Bank’s promotion of export agriculture (as a means of earning foreign currency) was 
one of the main factors leading to the debt crisis of the 1980s.  As increasing yields 
and subsidized US and EU grains drove down international commodity prices 
‘developing countries’ could not earn enough foreign currency to repay their loans.  
The debt crisis ushered in the era of structural adjustment at the World Bank and the 
turn towards neoliberal economic policies, relegating agriculture again to the bottom 
of the development agenda (Goldman 2005). 
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Thus after a 25-year hiatus, the fact that the World Bank is revisiting the 
development potentials of agriculture, as demonstrated in the 2008 WDR, is a 
significant discursive shift in development priorities.  This shift, in part, is a response 
to rising food insecurity and ecological crises, but also to the declining legitimacy of 
the neoliberal development paradigm, and thus, is an effort to re-legitimize 
development discourse and practice.  In sum, this discursive shift is an attempt to re-
establish the prominence of development during a historical moment of multiple and 
mutually conditioning social and ecological crises.   
While the WDR reflects the growing concern over the consequences that food, 
energy, and climate crises will have on agriculture, poverty, and development, it 
reproduces the modernist narrative of ‘backward’ (inefficient) peasant agriculture and 
the inevitable, and necessary, transition to an (efficient) agro-industrial model of 
agriculture and corporate-led commodity chains (McMichael 2009d; Amanor 2009; 
Akram-Lodhi 2009a).  The WDR’s response to these mounting crises illuminates how 
the World Bank is reframing agriculture and development in ways that mask 
underlying power relations.  Based on modernist assumptions of autonomous state-
based growth, universalized notions of progress, and teleological conceptions of 
development (stages of growth), the WDR provides ahistorical and depoliticized 
discursive framings of food, energy, and climate crises in the idiom of sustainable 
development (or ‘green capitalism’6).  In particular, the WDR employs state-based 
development narratives, and Malthusian and market-based framings of hunger and 
poverty that obscure (or misconstrue) historically constituted political and economic 
relations.  Although it proclaims support for small-scale agriculture, the WDR’s vision 
                                                
6 “Green capitalism” refers to an ideology that perpetuates capitalist forms of production and 
distribution, relying heavily on technological and market-based interventions as means of promoting 
sustainable development.  This concept is elaborated in chapters two and three (Goldman 2005; 
Friedmann 2005). 
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of agricultural efficiency entails the consolidation of land to maximize economies of 
scale, historically an avenue of peasant dispossession. 
 
De-politicizing Crises: Market-Based and Malthusian Framings in the WDR 
According to the WDR, the contemporary crises are framed as such: food 
insecurity is a result of market failures and low productivity while ecological and 
climate crises are attributed to poor resource management and poverty.  Both of these 
explanations locate responsibility for current crises either in the global South or as a 
result of market failures.  Such an approach necessarily neglects historical social and 
political relations. 
The WDR’s framing of food insecurity in terms of market failures is demonstrated 
in the report’s analysis of the world food crisis of the 1970s.  The WDR argues that 
supply and demand forces pushed food prices up while low foreign exchange reserves 
limited the ability of poor countries to import food.  The problem was purportedly 
worsened when countries tried to intervene in the market, as opposed to letting the free 
market adjust and stabilize prices.  In the words of the WDR,  
 
This rise in prices prompted some countries to look inward, striving for 
food self-sufficiency through domestic production.  But today with 
deeper international markets, lower real prices, and more countries with 
convertible exchange rates, trade can stabilize food availability and 
prices for most countries.  And most countries have diversified their 
export base, increasing their capacity to import (2008: 94). 
 
In these economistic terms, attempting national food self-sufficiency is an 
anachronism that needs to be replaced by the allocative efficiencies of the global 
market.  Food security for the WDR is predominantly defined by the ability of nations 
to import food and individual households to purchase food in the marketplace.  
Paradoxically, food security is particularly challenging for agricultural-based countries 
that are net-importers of food.  The WDR explains, 
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Almost all the agriculture-based countries are net importers of food 
staples, importing on average 14 percent of their total consumption 
over the past 10 years…most of the food insecure live in rural areas 
where food is produced, yet they are net food buyers rather than sellers.  
Poverty constrains their access to food in the marketplace (2008: 95). 
 
The WDR does not investigate why countries in the global South went from food 
self-sufficiency to net food importers.  Instead, instituting markets and export-led 
development are presented as the answer to the global South’s food crises, as opposed 
to part of the problem.  When problems arise from export-oriented agricultural 
policies, they are explained as a product of market imperfections.  Using the example 
of Brazil, the WDR argues,   
 
Yield gaps can arise because imperfections in credit and insurance 
markets prevent small farmers from adopting more productive capital-
intensive techniques or higher-value products…Imperfections in capital 
and insurance markets, combined with transaction costs, can also 
prevent markets for land sales and rentals from allocating land to the 
most efficient users (2008: 70).  
 
Consistent with neoliberal economic theory, markets are assumed to be self-
regulating, constantly achieving supply and demand equilibrium, creating price 
incentives and competition structures that increase production and distribution 
efficiencies.  Market imperfections, according to this logic, arise from market 
interventions by the state, or other factors, that limit the ‘self-regulating’ mechanisms 
of the market.   
By naturalizing the market, the WDR neglects that markets are always political 
constructions.  ‘Market imperfections’ are structural and political problems (as 
opposed to a natural outcome of economic laws) based on the unequal distribution of 
power within markets and the perpetuation of unfair trade regimes as dictated by the 
global North and established through international trade agreements (McMichael 
2004).  The political construction of markets is exemplified in the trade regime 
imposed through the “Agreement on Agriculture” (AoA) developed within the 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and institutionalized with the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.  The initial AoA within the 
WTO rested on three issues; market access, export subsidies, and domestic support 
(Rosset 2006).  Accordingly, countries were expected to reduce tariffs as a way to 
open national markets to global trade, ban export subsidies as way to stop agricultural 
dumping and create fair competition, and lastly, countries were allowed to maintain 
certain domestic programs (with the expectation of decreasing these) categorically 
distinguished by various “boxes” (Amber, Blue, Green) which subsidize (without 
distorting trade) environmental or social programs (ibid).  However, hidden in the 
complexity of legal and economistic regulatory language was a clear manipulation of 
the terms and conditions of these rules by the European Union and United States, 
which allowed countries in the global North to maintain subsidy programs supporting 
agro-industrial operations while the global South was expected to reduce support 
programs for smallholder farmers and open domestic markets to subsidized European 
and American commodities (McMichael 2004).  Hence, framing these problems as 
market imperfections obscures the political relations underlying market rules, and 
implies that liberalized markets can be perfected if the appropriate institutional 
policies allow the market to be free.  The WDR’s depoliticization of markets is one 
aspect of a general neglect of historical social relations.  In exposing the paradox that 
agricultural countries, and specifically rural areas, account for a large portion of food 
insecure people, the WDR neglects to historicize the policies and political 
interventions that have created food insecurity in these countries.   
Rarely are hunger and famine the sole result of food shortages or a lack of food 
production.7  More fundamentally, food insecurity is socially and historically 
                                                
7 Currently, as well as during the 1970s food crisis, global per capita food production is more than 
enough to feed the global population, and in many cases, national and regional per capita food 
production can meet domestic food security in the global South (Lappé, Collins, and Rosset 1998; 
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constituted within power relations that distort global, regional, and national production 
and distribution priorities (Lappé, Collins, and Rosset 1998; George 1976; Weiss 
2007).  Although hunger and starvation are not new in human history, the scale, 
severity, and frequency of famines dramatically increased during the colonial period 
(Davis 2002).8  For example, colonial restructuring of property relations and forceful 
integration of peasant agriculture into global markets created social vulnerabilities in 
the global South by promoting luxury food exports, such as coffee, sugar, tobacco, tea, 
and tropical fruits, at the expense of local and national food production and security. 9  
As such, colonial regimes disrupted and transformed local moral economies that 
maintained food storage for provisioning during years of low production, into export 
economies dependent on market-based food provisioning, which favored elite classes 
and created vulnerabilities for farmers and the working poor (Davis 2002).  Meat 
consumption has also skewed national and global food production and distribution 
towards affluent markets.  Over the last half-century, staple grains have increasingly 
been diverted from food production to livestock feed to meet the growing meat 
consumption of affluent consumers (Weiss 2007).  Underdevelopment and 
dependency theorists argued that contemporary global inequalities are conditioned by 
historically constituted power relations of colonialism and reproduced through global 
market relations (Amin 1994, Frank 1994).  Challenging the Modernization theoretical 
conception of linear and progressive stages of capitalist development, dependency and 
                                                                                                                                       
George 1976; Weiss 2007). 
8 Prior to the emergence of a global food economy, countries and societies suffered from periodic food 
shortages as a result of climatic variability, declining soil fertility, pest infestations, or other socio-
ecological disruptions, however, these food shortages were usually geographically bound and were 
managed through local adaptations in production and distribution systems that limited the extent of 
starvation.  Tying food production and provision to the logics of global markets, transformed locally 
and culturally embedded production and distribution systems and limited the ability of local 
communities and nations to manage food supplies (Davis 2001).  
9 For example, India is one of the largest agricultural exporting countries in the Global South, but nearly 
200 million Indians suffer from hunger (Lappé et al 1998: 9).  Likewise, Brazil exports food while 
nearly 70 million Brazilians cannot afford sufficient food (ibid: 10).  During the 1980s food exports in 
Sub-Saharan Africa exceeded food imports (ibid: 10). 
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underdevelopment theorists argued that colonialism, and its civilizing mission, 
fundamentally reconfigured colonial economies (subordinately) and social orders 
through resource/wealth extraction, capital accumulation and violent dispossession of 
land (Frank 1994; Bernstein 2000).  As opposed to framing ‘colonial countries’ as 
earlier ‘stages’ of societal development (or civilization), dependency theorists argued 
that the development of Europe was only possible through the forceful incorporation 
and underdevelopment of colonial societies into a global capitalist order (Frank 1994).  
Accordingly, capitalist economic expansion and colonialism structured power 
relations between the periphery and the core, creating social vulnerabilities and 
economic dependencies in the global South and conditions for capital accumulation in 
the global North (Amin 1994).10  
In similar fashion, Mike Davis argues in Late Victorian Holocaust that the 
culmination of colonial policies, integration in capitalist markets, and El Niño climate 
patterns precipitated the tragic famines in late Victorian India and China (2001).  
Although droughts in India and China reduced grain harvests, it was the shift to 
export-driven agriculture and the stripping of state services that created the conditions 
in which drought resulted in mass starvation.  Thus the impact of natural disasters is a 
combination of the intensity of a natural event/hazard and the socially constituted 
vulnerability of the population (resistance and resiliency).  Davis shows how the 
colonialist project – with its classical economic ideology – created peasant 
vulnerability on a massive scale.  In his words, “Millions died, not outside the 
“modern world system,” but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its 
economic and political structures” (Davis 2002: 9).  The imperialist project of 
                                                
10 Importantly, the ‘development industry’, as Rist calls it, perpetuated colonial relations through 
discursive framings of growth, progress, and modernity as colonial empires attempted to legitimize 
continued international intervention, thus perpetuating these historical relations under the premises of 
development (2002). 
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integrating colonized countries into the global capitalist markets deteriorated national 
sovereignty and dismantled agrarian social orders and the ability to maintain national 
or community food security (Bernstein 2000; Davis 2002).  Without state protection 
and stripped of the means of subsistence, the political implementation of unequal 
market relations undermined the ability of farmers to survive.  
Similarly, market-based reforms imposed by International Financial Institutions 
(such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO) have maintained and reproduced conditions of 
vulnerability in the global South under premises of international development.  The 
debt crisis, SAPs (ironically, the World Bank’s very own), and free trade policies, also 
played a prominent role in constructing small-holder vulnerability and instigating 
processes of depeasantization in the global South (Bello 2008; McMichael 2004; 
Araghi 2000; Patel 2002; Toussaint 2005).  In 2001, for example, part of the 
International Monetary Funds’ loan conditionality for Malawi was to reduce grain 
reserves from 165,000 metric tons to less than 60,000 tons for the purpose of earning 
more foreign exchange to service debts (Patel 2002).  The following year people 
starved as national grain harvests decreased, reserves were depleted, and people could 
not afford imported food (as was proposed by the IMF, and similarly in the market 
approach to food security proposed in the WDR).  The dismantling of social safety 
nets and the disruption of local markets by subsidized imports in the case of Malawi, 
illustrate the political implementation of markets and the creation of the conditions of 
vulnerability for African farmers.  
Neglecting these historical relations, the WDR argues, “Today, agriculture’s 
ability to generate income for the poor, particularly women, is more important for 
food security than its ability to increase local food supplies” (2008: 95, original 
emphasis).  Without problematizing the World Bank’s role in creating food insecurity, 
the WDR argues that income generation is more important for meeting food security 
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than growing food domestically.11  As a way to earn foreign exchange and balance 
import bills, the WDR promotes what they call the ‘new agriculture,’ which focuses 
on producing high value horticultural, livestock, and vegetables for European 
consumers.  However, this reinforces the export-oriented model of agricultural 
development that created the conditions of food insecurity in the first place. 
In addition to its ahistorical, economistic approach to food insecurity, the WDR 
recycles Malthusian framings to explain ecological degradation, poverty, and hunger 
as an additional way to displace responsibility from the global North to the South.  In 
explaining the “drivers of resource degradation,” the WDR points to poverty, 
population growth, and resource scarcity: 
 
Poverty is more likely to drive resource degradation in less-favored 
regions, where poor-quality and fragile soils must support rising 
populations densities…  Population pressure has mixed impacts on 
resource degradation, depending mainly on the available technology.  
As Malthus observed in 18th century England, population pressure 
without technological advances leads to agricultural encroachment into 
ever-more-marginal areas, reducing average yields, degrading 
resources, and worsening poverty.  When suitable technologies and 
institutions are available, however, population growth can lead to their 
adoption and sustain improvements in resource conditions and 
yields12…[however,] when population pressure is combined with high 
initial levels of poverty and few technology options for boosting 
productivity, degradation and poverty can spiral downward (2008: 181-
182). 
 
Population growth without technological advancement is presumed by the WDR to 
be the underlying dynamic of smallholder marginalization, and thus neglects the 
historical processes and political relations that cause smallholder marginalization.  In 
doing so, problems associated with smallholder marginalization are framed as 
technical issue as opposed to a political issue.  The report frames smallholder 
                                                
11 As will be elaborated further on, market-based approaches to food security have been strongly 
critiqued by the food sovereignty movement. 
12 “Because many natural resource management technologies are labor intensive population growth can 
actually assist their uptake because it lowers labor costs…” 
21 
marginalization as an inevitable process of nature (population growth and resource 
scarcity) – a product of the uncontrollable reproduction of the ‘poor’ that leads to their 
own poverty.  This image is invoked when the WDR employs the ‘vicious cycle of 
poverty’ metaphor (“degradation and poverty can spiral downward”), where poverty 
and population growth lead to over-exploitation of resources, thus exacerbating 
poverty and extending degradation to new lands (Ibid:181-182).  As with its approach 
to food insecurity, the WDR treats poverty as the natural condition of smallholder 
farmers, or as McMichael explains, the depiction of a poor African woman laboring in 
the fields in the opening line of the WDR “recycles the trope of poverty as an original 
condition defining much of the rural South” (2009d: 235).   
Accordingly, the WDR frames low-input agricultural practices of the poor as a 
major cause of environmental degradation.  Although the WDR cautions that intensive 
agriculture can lead to increased pollution, extensive agriculture driven by resource-
poor farmers is the main culprit of ecological degradation in their schema and is 
therefore in need of development.  This is evident in the WDR’s objectification of 
nature and social relations of production in constructing the concept of “less-favored 
areas.”13  Less-favored areas, according to the WDR, consist of two main features, a 
lack of market access and “poor agroecological conditions” (2008: 35).  In explaining 
the plight of less-favored areas the WDR states,  
 
…they are mostly characterized by extensive agriculture, resource 
degradation, and poverty…[and] encompass a broad array of low-input 
farming systems…Land degradation and deforestation in less-favored 
areas reduce agricultural productivity and cause the loss of other 
valuable ecosystem services, including biodiversity habitats…[for 
example,] soil nutrient mining resulting from shortening of fallows and 
                                                
13 “Many less-favored areas have gained little from past agricultural successes in raising yields.  Less-
favored areas include lands with low agricultural potential because of poor climate, soil, and 
topography; they also cover areas that may have higher agricultural potential but are underexploited 
because of limited access to infrastructure and markets, low population density, or social and political 
marginalization” (World Bank 2008:190). 
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very low use of fertilizer is endemic across much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (2008:190-191).  
 
In defining “less-favored areas,” the WDR employs naturalized (and politically 
sanitized) language of geography and demography, conjuring a sense of inevitability.  
While the WDR claims to focus on helping farmers in “less-favored areas,” they 
neglect to explain the historical processes that caused such marginality (again, 
naturalizing their condition).  By invoking the imagery of destitute lands being 
exploited by the primitive practices of poor people, the WDR depoliticizes the 
processes that lead to both resource degradation and poverty, proposing that poverty, 
hunger, and resource degradation is a technical problem (to be solved by expert 
knowledge/technology) as opposed to a political problem.  Missing the ways in which 
colonial restructuring, green revolution projects, and structural adjustment policies 
often create and perpetuate these conditions of marginality, the WDR provides an 
ahistorical account of these processes and thus reestablishes the need for external 
intervention: as the WDR identifies the practices of the poor as the source of 
ecological degradation, it points to technological improvement as the solution (to be 
discussed further below).  While these framings stem from modernist assumptions of 
development, they also serve to reproduce the institutional and programmatic 
objectives of dominant development institutions (i.e. providing loans for technology 
transfers). 
The discursive framing of “Africa” serves as an illustrative example of the WDR’s 
approach to food insecurity, ecological degradation, and poverty.  The constant refrain 
that Africa missed the green revolution is presented as a major cause of poverty and 
hunger in the continent.  Comparing Africa to Asia and Latin America, the WDR 
argues that while modern seeds and fertilizers rapidly improved agricultural 
productivity in Asia and Latin America, Africa still suffers from low productivity.  
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The implementation of seeds and fertilizers in Latin America and Asia, the WDR 
explains: 
 
…[were] accompanied by complementary investments in irrigation, 
rural roads, marketing infrastructure, financial services, and other 
factors that made using seed and fertilizer profitable and paved the way 
for dynamic commercial input markets.  But throughout most of Africa, 
these complementary investments are small or nonexistent, and private 
input markets have yet to emerge on a large scale (2008: 150). 
 
The WDR implies that hunger and poverty in Africa is the consequence of a lack 
of agro-chemical input markets that elsewhere stimulated economic growth.  Input and 
output markets are assumed by the WDR to be central coordinating features of modern 
agricultural production, where inputs and outputs are managed by agribusiness to 
increase yields and household incomes to meet food security.  The WDR views 
commercial agriculture, fully integrated in markets, as the most efficient method of 
reducing poverty and meeting food security.  Accordingly, 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is massively disadvantaged in infrastructure, 
increasing transaction costs and market risks…Largely because of 
poorly developed markets, fertilizer use in Sub- Saharan Africa has 
stagnated at very low levels, one of the main reasons for the region’s 
low agricultural productivity relative to Asia…[and] low volumes, high 
prices, high transport costs, and undeveloped private input markets are 
major barriers to fertilizer use in Sub-Saharan Africa (2008: 21, 55). 
 
In assuming the efficiencies of market-based agriculture, the WDR juxtaposes an 
inefficient peasant agriculture (measured by income generation) against highly 
efficient agro-industrial operations, and hence, as an impediment to meeting economic 
and social development goals.  Accordingly, the WDR reproduces the narrative that 
the green revolution bypassed Africa, resulting in a concurrent food crisis.  Or, in 
other words, because Africa lacks modern technologies and markets, the combination 
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of ‘primitive’ agricultural practices and poor soils cannot meet the food needs of 
Africa’s growing populations.14 
Not mentioned in the WDR are the ways in which the colonial restructuring of 
African economies, and subsequent development policies geared towards export 
agriculture have created and maintained inequalities and degraded local ecologies.  
The Malthusian trope of population growth and resource scarcity is invoked as a 
barrier to productivity gains.  However, Malthusian framings, focusing on the 
relationships between population growth and a shrinking resource base, homogenize 
people and practices across time and space, abstracting social relations and global 
power differentials.  Although the biological base of agriculture is being undermined, 
presenting clear biophysical limits, it is not the result of an abstract global population, 
but of historically constituted uneven distribution and consumption patterns coupled 
with extractive forms of production.  These relationships underlie the intensification of 
environmental degradation, which is now directly informing and reshaping 
development discourse as Wolfgang Sachs claims: 
 
What is new, in fact, is that the North is less and less protected by 
spatial and temporal distances from the unpleasant long-term 
consequences of its action…The more the rate of exploitation 
increases…the faster the finiteness of nature makes itself felt on a 
global scale.  Since the distance in time, which for so long bolstered 
industrialism against its effects, is shrinking, the biophysical limits of 
nature have forcefully emerged in the present (1997:292).  
                                                
14 In addition to the problematic framing of Africa as being ‘bypassed’ by the green revolution, this 
framing ignores the failures of the green revolution in Asia.  Behind the ‘success’ story of India’s green 
revolution, is a tragic and hidden story of debt, despair, and a suicide epidemic.  In India the 
introduction of biotech seeds and high cost chemical inputs resulted in massive smallholder debts 
(Shiva 2000).  The increased cost of production leaves smallholder agriculturalists vulnerable to failed 
harvests and low market prices.  Increased debt and precarious livelihoods of farmers in India has 
tragically resulted in rising farmer suicides (ibid).  Although green revolution technologies have proven 
to provide large productivity gains in the short term, examples from around the world show after these 
initial gains, yields begin to fall even with increased inputs (Gliessman 2000; Altieri 1995).  Since the 
price of genetically engineered seeds are far greater than conventional seed and necessitate other 
agrochemical inputs to create optimal conditions, farmers are dependent on agribusiness and risk 
bankruptcy if yields do not meet expectations.   
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The WDR’s framing of poverty, food insecurity, and ecological crises, pits 
technology against nature as the only viable solution.  It assumes that hunger is 
inevitable because of laws of nature, and that the interrelations between resource 
scarcity and hunger are natural processes of creating equilibrium.  Furthermore, 
Malthusian framings conjure up the ‘tragedy of the commons’ hypothesis whereby 
humans have a natural propensity to overexploit common lands, and thus, the rights of 
subsistence must be subordinated and transformed into formalized property rights.  
The WDR’s reductionist framing of hunger, poverty, and ecological degradation 
reduces political problems into technical problems, and places responsibility for 
poverty as well as food, energy, and climate crises firmly in the global South.15 
In addition to market-based and Malthusian assumptions, revealed in the WDR’s 
framing of agriculture, is the constant employment of the modernization dichotomy of 
developed and underdeveloped countries, which implies that a lack of development is 
the cause of hunger and poverty.  The next section interrogates these assumptions 
within the WDR and investigates the implications of such framings.   
 
State-Based Growth and the Reproduction of Modernist Ideas of Agriculture and 
‘Development’: Framing Crises as a Lack of ‘Development’   
Although the WDR’s proclamation that “it is time to place agriculture afresh at the 
center of the development agenda” suggests a revalorization of agriculture, its reliance 
on modernization theory reflects a continued subordination of agriculture to industry 
                                                
15 Market-based and Malthusian discourses shape policy options and allow the World Bank (and other 
development ‘experts’) to prescribe technological solutions.  Such conceptualizations legitimize the 
introduction of US and European Agribusiness and green revolution technologies into the agricultural 
sector of ‘developing countries’.  In other words, the discursive veil provides cover for western capital.  
In the case of Egypt, the World Bank funded the Agricultural Mechanization Project for the purchase of 
equipment and expertise from US agricultural corporations.  Roughly 42% of US economic assistance, 
$6.3 billion, was spent either in the US or to US agribusiness contractors (Mitchel 1991:32).  Although 
International development agencies couch agricultural mechanization projects in humanitarian 
discourse, they are largely subsidies to corporations, and the results of these projects rarely resolve the 
‘problem’. 
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(2008: 1).  Even the title of the report, “Agriculture for Development,” implies that 
agriculture, while discursively re-centered, is still conceptualized as the servant to 
(industrial) development; a stepping stone on the path towards modernity.  Similar to 
Rostow’s stage theory of modernization, the report’s foundational assumption is that 
peasant agriculture is the ‘baseline of development’ (McMichael 2009d).  This 
schematic is apparent in the WDR’s categorization and hierarchical ranking of three 
types of countries: ‘agriculture based countries,’ ‘transforming countries,’ and 
‘industrialized countries.’  Implied throughout the report is a linear, evolutionary (or 
natural), progression from ‘agriculture-based countries’ to ‘transforming countries” 
and eventually, ‘industrialized countries.’16  From this vantage point, the poverty of 
peasants and smallholder agriculturalists is an a priori condition, a product of their 
agrarian life.  In other words, the WDR conceptualizes peasants as relics of an 
impoverished primitive past, lacking modern technology, development investments, 
and markets.  In creating these stages, poverty becomes a natural condition of agrarian 
communities.  
The WDR highlights “success” stories to demonstrate the progression from 
agriculture-based countries to industrial countries.  The WDR explains, 
 
Agricultural growth was the precursor to the acceleration of industrial 
growth [in China], very much in the way agricultural revolutions 
predated the industrial revolutions that spread across the temperate 
world from England in the mid-18th Century to Japan in the late 19th 
Century (2008: 25). 
 
Here, the WDR misconstrues history in creating a comparable development model 
across time and space that reinforces a narrative of national-based evolutionary 
progress, independent of external factors.  In lumping China, Japan, and England 
within the same ‘model’ of development, the WDR conflates the historical 
                                                
16 Agricultural based countries are also referred to in the report as poor, underdeveloped, or developing, 
and industrial countries are also referred to as high-income countries. 
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specificities, neglects world-historical conditions, and contextual details that might 
explain the specific conditions of, and variations between, these countries.  As 
McMichael puts it, “The problem with this representation of history is that it 
compounds the misconstruction of a nationally organized social division of labor 
between agriculture and industry for each era (2009d: 238).  The WDR assumes that 
industrial development is an autonomous state-based phenomenon, and in doing so 
neglects the world historical relations that shaped the dynamics within these countries.  
For example, to overlook the relationship between England’s colonial empire and its 
industrial growth is to fundamentally neglect world historical dynamics, such as the 
global division of labor under British imperial rule that provided raw materials for 
England’s mills and cheap food for factory workers (McMichael 2009d).  It also 
masks the violent dispossession of peasants and craftsmen preceding England’s 
industrial revolution (Wood 2002, Polanyi 2001).   
“There is no unique route,” according to the WDR, “for a country to move from an 
agriculture-based to an urbanized and eventually to a high-income country” (2008: 
30).  Although the WDR suggests there are numerous “routes” of development, the 
stages are predetermined, linear, and progressive.  Stating that ‘developing countries’ 
eventually become ‘high-income countries,’ the WDR reproduces the teleological 
assumptions of modernization theory, in which the assumed end goal of this 
evolutionary progression is the consumer society typified by the US and Europe.  In 
doing so, the WDR perpetuates Eurocentric conceptions of development against which 
all other countries are measured.   
The WDR’s repeated assertion that agriculture has a declining significance in 
national GDP as countries develop assumes a natural (state-based) progression and 
shift in importance away from agriculture towards industry.  This assumption 
demonstrates the market fetishism inherent in the WDR, which de-values non-
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marketized relations, such as subsistence agriculture, that are not calculated in GDP.  
The construction of GDP (as a measurement of development) reifies the national 
economy as the object of growth, fetishizes economic growth, and invisibilizes non-
marketized relations.  As such, the WDR envisions economic growth in which state 
policies are geared towards creating a ‘good investment climate’ for agribusiness to 
establish input and output markets as a way to commercialize smallholder agriculture.  
Likewise, public expenditures are promoted to help facilitate market access for 
smallholders, by investing in infrastructure.  For instance, the WDR purports, 
 
Improving and modernizing the marketing system can increase market 
efficiency, foster competitiveness with imports, and reduce losses and 
risks.  Market modernization, beyond improving basic transport, 
includes marketing information systems, commodity exchanges, and 
price-risk management (2008:153). 
 
This passage implies that if the appropriate institutional arrangements are set up by 
developing states (‘modernizing market information, transport, management), then the 
country will be ready for market liberalization and connecting to global value chains 
through the ‘new’ high-value agriculture. 
When the WDR proposes placing agriculture at the center of the development 
agenda, it is important to ask what type of agricultural investments are being promoted 
and by whom?  The answer to these questions is explicitly addressed in the section 
titled “Agribusiness for development.”  In this section, the WDR outlines a corporate-
led conception of agricultural development based on integrating smallholders into 
global value chains.  In the words of the WDR,   
 
Agribusiness is the off-farm link in agrofood value chains.  It provides 
inputs to the farm sector, and it links the farm sector to consumers 
through the handling, processing, transportation, marketing, and 
distribution of food and other agricultural products.  Thus, there are 
strong synergies between agribusiness and the performance of 
agriculture for development.  Dynamic and efficient agribusiness spurs 
agricultural growth.  And a strong link between agribusiness and 
smallholders can reduce rural poverty (2008: 135). 
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The ‘agriculture for development’ agenda can easily be confused with the 
‘agribusiness for development’ agenda.  Hidden behind the rhetoric of helping 
smallholder agriculture is the goal of commercializing farmers by integrating them 
into value chains.  State interventions are only proposed to facilitate the transition 
towards a liberalized economy, and the presumed gains of international comparative 
advantage.  An insert on Uganda’s strategy for implementing an ‘agriculture for 
development’ agenda provides an insight into the WDR’s vision of a successful 
agrarian transition.  The report states of Ugandan policy: 
 
The Plan for Modernizing Agriculture is Uganda’s strategy to reduce 
poverty by increasing rural household incomes, food security, and 
employment, and by transforming subsistence agriculture to 
commercial agriculture…The plan is based on the vision of using 
agriculture for development and progress has been steady, but slower 
than expected.  Institutional change is slow, always challenging, not 
easily observed, and underappreciated, making the deepening of 
reforms difficult…Despite slow progress in a number of areas, the 
Plan, overall, is emerging as a success (2008: 249). 
 
The “emerging success” of Uganda’s agriculture for development agenda is 
explicitly stated: the commercialization of agriculture via the ‘slow progress’ of 
institutional reform.  The WDR applauds Uganda’s neoliberal policy turn and its 
stated goal of instituting a national policy of depeasantization, presenting a 
paradoxical conceptualization of the role of the state in national agricultural 
development.  While the WDR emphasizes the role of the state, it simultaneously 
promotes private sector governance of agricultural markets and global value chains.  
What, then, is the assumed role of the state?  After two decades of neoliberal 
development policies, epitomized by the structural adjustment regime at the World 
Bank, the capacities of states to regulate national economies has been greatly 
undermined by transnational capital.  In a period when capital became the organizing 
force behind global markets, states (and citizens) were increasingly disciplined by the 
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demands and expectations of transnational capital (Gill 1995).  Indebted countries in 
the global South were forced by SAPs to open their markets to transnational capital.  
World Bank loans were premised on conditions that states prioritize earning foreign 
currency for debt payments (including export agriculture) at the expense of public 
welfare.  Furthermore, neoliberalization pressured states to reduce labor and 
environmental standards, privatize public utilities, state functions, land, and other 
resources, in pursuit of foreign direct investment.  While neoliberalization opened new 
avenues for capital accumulation, these processes deepened global inequalities (Wade 
2004; Harvey 2005).  As for agriculture, market liberalization further entrenched 
processes of depeasantization as smallholder farmers faced competitive pressures from 
subsidized agroindustrial operations in the global North (McMichael 2004).17  
Therefore, the WDR’s repeated refrain that the role of the state is to create a ‘good 
investment climate’ (or sometimes, ‘good business environment’) reproduces the 
neoliberal development assumption that markets and transnational capital are the 
appropriate paths for national development.  However, this contradicts the WDR 
assumption of autonomous state-based growth.  Since neoliberal development policies 
favor the free movement of transnational capital over national development initiatives, 
the economic outcomes of development processes are predicated on transnational 
linkages and the relative positioning of national economy within the global economy.  
This approach often leads to the extraction of wealth from national economies as 
opposed to the development of national industries (Chang 2002).  Clearly, the WDR’s 
agriculture for development agenda reinforces, and naturalizes, the international 
division of labor, where the Global South exports raw materials and luxury 
agricultural products for consumption in the Global North.  As such, states only 
facilitate the entry of transnational agribusiness to manage input and output markets; 
                                                
17 The WDR’s approach to smallholder farmers will be elaborated in the following chapter. 
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through competition large-scale and capital endowed farmers can consolidate 
economies of scale and exploit their comparative advantage.18   
The WDR does not problematize corporate led development or the World Bank’s 
role in promoting deleterious development models.  After explaining that SAPs were 
“inevitable due to the debt crisis” (a consequence of the World Bank’s development 
paradigm), the WDR diverts responsibility of the “second generation problems” 
caused by market liberalization to improper state implementation of liberalization 
policies and market failures.  Explaining the reasons why SAPs did not work, the 
WDR claims, 
 
In some places the state’s withdrawal was tentative at best, limiting 
private entry.  Elsewhere, the private sector emerged only slowly and 
partially—mainly serving commercial farmers but leaving many 
smallholders exposed to extensive market failures, high transaction 
costs and risks, and service gaps.  Incomplete markets and institutional 
gaps impose huge costs in forgone growth and welfare losses for 
smallholders, threatening their competitiveness and, in many cases, 
their survival (2008: 138). 
 
In blaming developing countries, the WDR implies that poverty and hunger is the 
result of either improper development implementation or a lack of development (as 
mention previously in the WDR’s assertion that the green revolution bypassed Africa).  
Therefore, one of the clear contradictions in the WDR is that on one hand it calls for a 
renewed effort among nation-states to ‘develop’ their agricultural sectors, while on the 
other hand they are promoting globalized corporate value chains that, in many cases, 
supersede the authority of national governments under a neoliberal trade regime.  The 
WDR argues, “linking technological progress with institutional innovations and 
                                                
18 Agriculture in the ‘developing countries’ is perceived as serving, and thus dependent on, European 
and U.S. consumer demands and supply chain standards as dictated by supermarket retailers.  As the 
WDR states, private interests determine whether to invest based on “potential profitability” and as a 
result, the whims of capital trump the ability of states to control national economies, stripping them of 
the ability to genuinely support small-holder agriculture (2008: 150).  
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markets to engage this diverse set of actors is at the heart of future productivity 
growth…  Building input markets must go hand-in-hand with building output markets 
and linking farmers to those markets” (2008: 153).  This highlights the contradictions 
of basing development policy around a theory of state-based development in a 
neoliberal context where capital organizes the global economy, often disciplining 
states.  In the dominant neoliberal model, value is increasingly concentrated in 
corporate links of global commodity chains as opposed to generating nation-based 
economic growth.  The WDR promotes conditions in which transnational capital 
maintains hegemonic control over the allocation of value thereby limiting the ability 
of nation-states to advance policies that would effectively retain value within national 
borders.  The WDR envisions an agrarian transition in which transnational 
agribusiness will meet global food, energy and climate security by integrating peasants 
into corporate supply chains, displacing inefficient peasant production. 
In his study of a ten-year span of World Development Reports, Paul Cammack 
argues that the World Bank’s discourse of poverty reduction is couched in a larger 
project to advance global capitalist expansion.  With regard to the World Bank’s stated 
commitment to poverty reduction, Cammack notes, 
 
While the Bank’s commitment to poverty reduction is real, within 
limits, it is conditional upon, and secondary to, a broader goal.  Its 
principle objective is the systematic transformation of social relations 
and institutions in the development world, in order to generalize and 
facilitate proletarianization and capitalist accumulation on a global 
scale, and build specifically capitalist hegemony through the promotion 
of legitimating schemes of community participation and country 
ownership (2004: 190). 
 
Cammack’s insights regarding the World Bank’s efforts to globalize neoliberal 
practices are also evident in the most recent WDR’s stance on agriculture.  Although 
the WDR promotes a ‘sustainable’ agrarian transformation in the global South, this 
transformation is envisioned within a capitalist framework, extending the capital and 
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energy intensive agro-industrial model and subordinating food and energy 
sovereignty. 
 
CHALLENGES TO THE “AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT” AGENDA: IAASTD 
AND THE PROBLEMATIZATION OF THE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL MODEL 
The publication of the 2008 WDR was timely, coinciding with the world food 
crisis and following on the heels of a global assessment of agriculture, the 
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD).  The IAASTD is a report sponsored by the UN Environment 
Program, Food and Agriculture Organization, and Development Program; UNESCO; 
Global Environment Facility; and the World Bank, and involved more than four years 
of research from over 400 experts (Ishii-Eiteman and Ching 2008).  Its central 
argument is that the ability of farmers in developing countries to produce sufficient 
food, feed, fuel, and fiber, while maintaining environmental services, is being 
undermined by the social and ecological consequences of agro-industrialization and 
the subordination of locally resilient food systems to globalized markets.  The report 
calls for a dramatic shift in how agriculture is viewed by development institutions and 
national governments and suggests a re-centering of agriculture that prioritizes 
ecologically sound practices, local and national markets over global markets, and 
embraces the multiple functions of agriculture by supporting smallholder agriculture 
and locally embedded agroecological knowledge. 
Whereas the WDR frames “underdevelopment” (meaning the ‘lack of 
development’) as a central cause of poverty and ecological degradation, the IAASTD 
sees misguided development models as a central cause of contemporary ecological and 
social crises.  As stated therein,  
 
The drivers of ecological change can best be understood as the 
consequences of development models pursued over the 20th century.  
Broadly conceived, the regional imbalance of economic growth, its 
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contribution to the ecological crisis and its effects are differentially 
experienced in countries of the North and the South.  There are multiple 
causal interlinkages between environmental degradation and poverty, 
which are exacerbated by the uneven distribution of and access to 
resources (natural resources, capital, information, etc.) between regions 
and within countries.  For instance, small island nations and the coastal 
populations of developing countries, which contribute the least to 
global warming, will be among the first to disappear, yet have very 
limited if any capacity or resources to respond to such crises (2008: 
21). 
 
Instead of taking poverty as a given condition and disconnected from power 
relations, the IAASTD focuses here on the production of inequalities through uneven 
development processes, both between and within countries.  ‘Market failures’ are not 
presumed to cause poverty, rather politically and historically constituted patterns of 
“uneven distribution of and access to resources” (2008: 21).  While the WDR 
consistently uses Malthusian framings, which naturalize the relationship between 
poverty and ecological degradation (‘the vicious cycle’), the IAASTD politicizes the 
historically constituted relationships between the global North and South that 
condition both poverty and ecological degradation.  As such, it places a greater burden 
and responsibility on the global North for the reproduction of food insecurities and 
climate change. 
The IAASTD problematizes the productivist paradigm espoused by the WDR and 
its insistence on increasing agricultural productivity via technological innovation.  In 
contrast, the IAASTD observes, “the substantial number of hungry and malnourished 
people in [North America and Europe] indicates that more production does not 
necessarily equate with hunger reduction” (2008: 21).  By raising the issue of hunger 
in North America and Europe, the IAASTD problematizes the assumption, implied 
throughout the WDR, that the ‘high income’ countries in the North symbolize the 
highest stage of development and that productivity gains can reduce inequality and 
hunger.  In fact, the ‘unintended consequences’ of the agro-industrial model, as well as 
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the knowledge production that undergirds this model, are a central problem according 
to the IAASTD:   
 
Agriculture and the knowledge systems that are relevant to the sector 
now face an impasse.  There are tremendous achievements in science 
and production, yet some of the unintended consequences of these very 
achievements have not been sufficiently addressed.  To address these 
consequences it is important to account for the prevalent inequalities 
that characterize relations between regions and countries as well as 
within them (2008:18). 
 
The IAASTD does not assume that productivity gains will address the issue of 
hunger.  Underlying the problem of hunger is deepening inequalities – both intra- and 
inter- regional disparities.  Furthermore, the IAASTD problematizes the productivity 
gains realized via green revolution technologies 
 
…the widespread realization that despite significant achievements in 
our ability to increase agricultural productive capacity to meet growing 
demand, we have been less attentive to some of the unintended social 
and ecological consequences of our technological and economic 
achievements. We are now in a better position to reflect on these costs 
and to outline policy options to meet the challenges ahead of us, 
perhaps best characterized as the need for food security under 
increasingly constrained environmental conditions and globalized 
economic systems (2008: 30). 
 
Moreover, in contrast to the WDR, the agro-industrial model of development is not 
presumed to be a sustainable model for African development.  As stated in the 
IAASTD, “environmental goals are important globally despite pressure on the 
environment due to relatively high industrialization, urbanization and productivity 
enhancing agricultural practices in North America and Europe, and pressures to 
enhance productivity even at the cost of environmental goods and services in Sub-
Saharan Africa” (2008: 21).  Of primary concern in the IAASTD is the treatment of 
social inequalities, both intra- and inter-nationally.  As noted therein, many of the 
regional assessments “indicate that the unequal distribution of resources is a major 
constraint that shapes development needs and impedes the achievement of all other 
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development and sustainability goals” (2008: 22).  By historicizing poverty as a partial 
condition of uneven development and historically constituted inequalities, the 
IAASTD turns a critical eye toward dominant development models and their role in 
creating global ecological and social change.  In a world characterized by “asymmetric 
development, unsustainable natural resource use, and continued rural and urban 
poverty,” the IAASTD argues that the “consequences of these global changes have the 
most devastating impacts on the poorest, who historically have had limited 
entitlements and opportunities” (2008: 18).  As such, the IAASTD does not simply 
blame a lack of modern technologies and market access as the cause of poverty, as 
argued in the WDR, but rather proposes alternative forms of development based on 
participatory and democratic principles. 
Accordingly, trade is not treated as the universal answer to hunger, poverty, and 
ecological degradation, since “agriculture has been subject to worsening terms of 
trade, globally as well as nationally,” meanwhile, “the burden of poverty in the sector 
is incommensurate with the magnitude and range of expectations from agriculture” 
(2008: 22).  The IAASTD argues that historically constituted unequal power relations 
within the global food economy exacerbate global inequalities.  “The current global 
system,” as argued in the report, “pits small-scale, largely subsistence farmers in 
rainfed agricultures against farmers who during the past century have been assisted to 
increasingly capture economies of scale by specialization and externalizing social and 
environmental costs” (2008:18).  As such, the ability to address inequalities through 
market integration is minimal under current global political economic conditions.  
More important than integrating smallholders into markets, is determining which types 
of market integration benefits smallholders as opposed to corporate agribusiness.   
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FRAMING AGRICULTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTIPLE CRISES: IMPLICATIONS 
OF DIVERGENT EPISTEMES 
While contemporary socio-ecological crises are the result of historically 
constituted power relations culminating in the wake of three decades of neoliberal 
development policies, the WDR’s framing of agriculture neglects and depoliticizes 
these social relations.  Although the WDR frames the food crisis as the outcome of 
population growth, induced scarcity, market imperfections, and the result of 
underdevelopment, they neglect the longer historical processes of depeasantization 
and the global restructuring of agriculture and food systems.  From colonialism to 
neoliberalism, agricultural modernization projects, in their various manifestations, 
have promoted the industrialization of agriculture (biological simplification and 
energy/capital intensification) for the purpose of high yielding export production.  By 
imposing competitive forces through the price mechanism of capitalist markets, 
modernist approaches to development further facilitate de-peasantization and 
processes of capital accumulation (Araghi 2000; Harvey 2003).  The simultaneous 
growth of slums in the global South and the concentration of market power and wealth 
in agribusiness are emblematic of both of these processes (Davis 2006; Araghi 2000, 
Heffernan 2000, Murphy 2008, Harvey 2005).  Consistently, development projects 
have subordinated agriculture to industrial development.  Although the WDR argues 
for pro-poor development and the support of smallholder agriculture, the modernist 
assumptions upon which they base their development model continues the trend of 
subordinating agriculture to capital. 
While the WDR shows concern for reducing smallholder poverty and meeting 
food, energy, and climate security, their reliance on neoliberal strategies, including the 
centrality of global markets, the state’s role in facilitating a business environment, and 
relying on business to coordinate global commodity chains, implies an unstated 
scenario of continued depeasantization presupposing a ‘planet of slums’ in which 
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surplus laborers are completely dependent upon corporate provisioning and market 
relations (Davis 2006; Araghi 2000).  The culmination and mutually conditioning 
processes of these crises clearly illustrate the contradictions of the dominant 
development paradigm where the naturalized language of market led growth obscures 
historical processes and depoliticizes development.   
As the WDR’s ‘agriculture for development’ agenda exemplifies, green neoliberal 
discourse privileges market relations over non-marketized social relations.  Although 
the WDR employs the discourse of sustainability, the report does not question the 
underlying capitalist episteme through which they propose a sustainable smallholder 
development agenda.  By tying sustainability to a universalizing conception of 
development premised on unlimited economic growth, the WDR accounts for nature 
through commercial inputs, payments for environmental services and other market 
mechanisms, which, in effect, expand the realm of commodity relations (Lohmann 
2006; Martinez-Alier 2002, Sachs 1993).  Since the social and ecological relations of 
smallholder farmers are largely outside the realm of commodity relations, these 
farmers are perceived as impediments to economic growth.  By reproducing modernist 
assumptions, the WDR’s ‘green neoliberal’ development discourse denigrates peasants 
as the objects, as opposed to subjects, of development (Cooper and Packard 1998; 
Ferguson 1994).  As such, the WDR imposes western technological interventions on 
peasants as opposed to supporting a peasant-led agenda, as endorsed by the IAASTD.  
Discursive framings have material consequences, including implications for 
development policies as well as political implications with regard to the future and 
function of smallholder agriculture.  The IAASTD’s challenge to the WDR’s 
‘agriculture for development agenda’ reflects a growing skepticism of the 
agroindustrial model.  In critiquing the validity of dominant development narratives, 
the IAASTD reflects an epistemic tension in dominant development discourses.  The 
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competing discursive framings of the place and role of smallholder agriculture in 
development in the WDR and the IAASTD have important implications for 
development policies and practices.  In light of multiple reinforcing social and 
ecological crises, political struggles are forming around the framing of the causes and 
consequences of crises, and consequently, the framing of solutions.  The IAASTD 
reflects the seriousness of this moment in stating; “Our perception of the challenges 
and the choices we make at this juncture in history will determine the future of human 
beings and their environment” (2008: 21). 
The next chapter explores the epistemic differences between the WDR and 
IAASTD regarding the role of technology, markets, and agribusiness in supporting 
multifunctional agriculture and smallholder farms.  The WDR envisions a privatized 
system of international food, energy, and climate security managed by corporate 
conglomerations in which the assumed allocative efficiencies of markets are utilized 
through corporate managed supply chains to facilitate the multiple functions of 
agriculture, including meeting energy, food, fiber, feedstock, or carbon sequestration.  
In contrast, the IAASTD’s conceptualization of multifunctionality is premised upon 
principles of agroecology and food sovereignty in which technological interventions 
and market solutions are subordinated to the integrity of agroecosystems and local 
knowledges.    
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CHAPTER 2 
‘SOLUTIONS’ TO THE CRISES?:  
THE WDR AND IAASTD ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, 
AGRIBUSINESS, AND SMALLHOLDER FARMERS 
 
The WDR and IAASTD present two competing visions of agricultural 
development reflecting different framings of food, energy, and climate crises and the 
specific roles of agriculture and development in relation to these crises.  While both 
are premised on the promotion of smallholder agriculture19 and utilizing the multiple 
functions of agriculture to address contemporary social and ecological crises, the 
contrasting perspectives on the role of biotechnologies and markets in attaining 
‘sustainable development’ goals expose an epistemic tension within dominant 
development discourse.  In particular, the divergent perspectives between the WDR 
and IAASTD on technological and market interventions reflect conflicting 
conceptions of multifunctionality, the future of smallholder agriculture, and food 
security.  Whereas biotechnology and market mechanisms are central to the WDR’s 
conception of multifunctionality, the IAASTD promotes culturally embedded 
agroecological knowledge as the basis for supporting multifunctional agriculture.   
Focusing on the role of biotechnologies and market mechanisms in relation to 
sustainable development goals (including energy security, climate change mitigation 
and adaptation, poverty reduction and food security) this chapter examines the 
epistemic tensions between the solutions proposed in the WDR and IAASTD.  While 
the WDR locates ‘sustainable solutions’ within the agro-industrial model of 
development where biotechnologies, agribusiness, and market mechanisms facilitate 
and coordinate sustainable development, the IAASTD challenges the agro-industrial 
model of development and lends legitimacy to the principles of agroecology and food 
                                                
19 Though, as will be demonstrated further on, there is a difference between the WDR’s rhetorical 
commitment to smallholder farmers and the IAASTD’s substantive commitment to this group. 
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sovereignty within dominant development institutions.  These contestations over the 
agroindustrial model of development expose conflicting valuation systems and 
epistemic assumptions about the future role and function of smallholder agriculture 
within dominant development discourse.  Before contrasting the WDR and IAASTD, I 
historicize the central role of agro-industrialization in creating contemporary socio-
ecological crises as a basis to situate the WDR’s “agriculture for development” 
agenda. 
 
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: 
HISTORICIZING THE METABOLIC RIFT OF AGRO-INDUSTRIALIZATION AND 
SITUATING THE WDR 
The spatial and temporal reconfigurations of socio-ecological relations in the 
historical development of capitalism are central to understanding contemporary socio-
ecological crises, as well as the ways in which proposed solutions to these crises either 
reproduce, or challenge, the spatial and temporal logics of capitalist modes of 
production and distribution.  The initial socio-ecological rupture of capitalist 
development was instigated by the process of primitive accumulation through which 
capitalist forms of production transformed agrarian relations and initiated subsequent 
capitalist interventions via processes of agroindustrialization.  
Primitive accumulation, according to Marx, was the forceful process of 
commodifying land and labor through the dispossession of land from peasants, 
creating both land and labor markets for capitalist production (Glassman 2006).  The 
transformation of labor and land into inputs of production, to be bought and sold 
according to market prices, was the precursor to capitalist modes of agrarian 
production in 16th century England.  This transformation marked a “rupture in age-old 
patterns of human interaction with nature in the production of life’s most basic 
necessities” by propelling competitive capitalist relations that intensified the extraction 
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of surplus value from labor and soil fertility, and instituted the market as the mediator 
of social reproduction (Wood 2002: 14).  As Polanyi wrote about the fictitious 
commodification of land and labor in nineteenth century, “to include [fictitious 
commodities] in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society 
itself to the laws of the market” (2001: 71).  The implementation of capitalist market 
relations was not a natural evolution of society but rather a political project that 
subordinated non-capitalist socio-ecological relations to market relations, resulting in 
socio-ecological crises (e.g. pauperization, starvation, and water and air pollution in 
19th century England).   
Although ecological degradation is not new to capitalism, Marx noted the 
increasing pace and intensity of ecological degradation as rising urbanization 
separated labor (via peasant dispossession) from the location of production (the 
countryside), increasing the spatial distance of production and consumption of food.  
This spatial separation ruptured the recycling of nutrients in agriculture and created a 
double environmental problem of declining soil fertility in the countryside and sewage 
contamination of freshwater in urban centers (Foster 2000).  In addition, capitalist 
relations reorganized the temporal features of agricultural production as profit oriented 
production provided the impetus for productivity gains, expressed by a reduction of 
fallow periods, field rotations, and increasingly intensive tillage (Mazoyer and 
Roudart 2006).  The increasing material and energy flows necessary to sustain social 
metabolism of urban populations, as well as the distribution and recycling of waste 
were increasingly ‘delinked’ from the territorial boundaries of the city or congruent 
rural regions.  The temporal features of capital accumulation, based on the continuous 
drive for profits, subordinated the temporal features of ecological reproduction.  
Instead of allowing ecological processes to restore soil fertility through periods of 
fallow, cover crops, agroforestry, or intercropping (which may reduce yields in the 
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short run, but sustain them in the long run), capitalist modes of agriculture relied on 
external inputs to artificially maintain soil nutrients and increase short term yields at 
the expense of long-term sustainability.  The ecological contradiction of capitalist 
temporal and spatial reconstitution of production and distribution, in Marx’s terms, 
signaled a metabolic rift between society and nature (Foster 1999).  The expansion of 
ecological crises to a global scale, according to Moore (2000), was the product of an 
emerging world-economy in the 16th century which re-organized global ecological 
relations around the temporal and spatial patterns of capital accumulation.  
  While the socio-ecological crises in England were initially overcome by 
extending export agriculture to the colonies (the spatial fix of capital via agro-
imperialism), subsequent solutions to declining agricultural productivity relied on 
technological innovations (or the technological fix of capital).  These technological 
innovations, such as the mechanization of farm equipment and the production of 
synthetic fertilizers, led to a series of uneven agricultural revolutions across Europe 
that intensified the exploitation of labor and land.  Importantly, the shift from animal 
and labor power to mechanical and industrial technologies deeply entangled 
agricultural production with the extraction and consumption of fossil fuel energy.  The 
original development and continued replication of the agro-industrial model was, and 
continues to be, contingent upon cheap and abundant supplies of energy.20 
                                                
20 As an example, the US agricultural system is arguably the epitome of energy and capital intensive 
agriculture.  Pimentel calculates that “about 19 percent of the total [US] national energy use” is spent in 
the production, distribution and retailing of food (2009b:92).  This breaks down to approximately 7% 
for production, 7% for processing and packaging, and 5% for transportation and preparation (ibid).  In 
fact, it takes 13 calories of energy to produce each food calorie consumed in the U.S. (ibid).  Soil and 
water, the primary elements of agricultural production, have also become a source of energy 
consumption and waste.  The U.S. loses on average 13 metric tons of topsoil per hectare per year 
(Pimentel 2009b).  The energy equivalence to replace these lost nutrients in the form of fertilizers is 
estimated at 880,000 Kcal per hectare for nitrogen and 440,000 Kcal per hectare for potassium and 
phosphorus (Pimentel 2009b).  Irrigation not only stresses water resources, it requires massive 
quantities of fossil fuel energy to construct and maintain infrastructure, and to pump and apply water.  
The maintenance of soil fertility via synthetic fertilizers accounts for the largest portion of energy 
consumption in industrial agriculture, accounting for 20% of U.S. agricultural energy use.  Irrigation 
pumps also account for 19% of energy consumption in US agriculture (Brown 2006).  Globally, Lester 
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However, the processes of agro-industrialization were, and still are, historically 
contingent and contested.  While the spatial fix of agro-imperialism was met with 
resistance and relied on the violent appropriation and restructuring of colonial 
agriculture, the technical fix met biophysical and scientific barriers.  Specifically, the 
biological foundation of agricultural production (or the temporal and spatial 
specificities of ecologies) presented barriers to the complete industrial transformation 
of agriculture.  As such, the industrial strategies of appropriation and substitution, 
according to Goodman, Sorji, and Wilkinson (1987), characterize the uneven 
development of agro-industrialization.  Industrial capital, on one hand, appropriates 
discrete elements of agricultural production and transforms them through industrial 
processes for the subsequent “reincorporation [of these elements] as inputs for 
production” (ibid: 2).21  On the other hand, agricultural produce is subject to industrial 
substitution during post-harvest processing in which agricultural products are the raw 
material inputs for industrial foods, cosmetics, or other products.  “The industrial 
transformation of agriculture,” Goodman et al argue, “has occurred historically 
through a series of partial discontinuous appropriations of the rural labor and 
biological production processes and the parallel development of industrial substitutes 
for rural products” (1987: 2).  While most industrial interventions in agriculture before 
the 1930s were mechanical and chemical (i.e. tractors, synthetic inputs), the advent of 
hybrid seeds and the subsequent development of the biotechnology industry 
thoroughly deepened the agro-industrial model. 
                                                                                                                                       
Brown estimates that the percentage of energy-use from fertilizers is much higher and that for some 
countries, such as India, irrigation may account for 50% of the agricultural energy bill (ibid). 
21 For example, agro-industrialization supplanted animal powered plows for trackers and manures and 
cover crops for synthetic fertilizers (ibid).  Whereas non-mechanized corn production takes 1,200 hours 
of human labor per hectare, a modern mechanized corn operation requires only 11 hours of human labor 
time or about 110 times less labor time (Pimintel 2009b 99). 
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The development of Recombinant DNA scientific methods based on Watson and 
Cricks’ 1955 work on genetic coding undergirded the research and development of 
plant biotechnologies in the early 1970s.  These new techniques allowed for greater 
ability of industrial capitals to appropriate social and ecological production processes 
of agriculture.  The genetic manipulation of seeds allowed biotechnology industries to 
simultaneously appropriate the production process (by controlling the reproduction of 
seeds and creating input dependencies) and to exploit new plant traits for the purpose 
of post-harvest industrial processing (Goodman et al 1987).  The biological and 
political obstacles to the commodification of seeds were overcome by the corporate 
appropriation of the scientific and technological innovations of public research 
institution (which overcame biological barriers) and through favorable legislation 
(political barrier), which granted patents for genetic material, bestowing the legal 
privileges of intellectual property rights to the seed industry (Kloppenburg 2004).  
While the risk of legal sanctions against farmers collecting their own seeds upheld 
corporate property rights, the biotechnology industry, in collaboration with university 
researchers, also developed the ‘terminator’ gene, a transgene that renders seeds 
sterile, as a way to control the production process and incorporate farmers into circuits 
of capital (the technological treadmill).  The genetic engineering of seeds illustrates 
Kloppenburg’s statement that “the appropriation of nature becomes a means for the 
subjugation of the social world” in that seeds are positioned at the nexus of both social 
and ecological reproduction and their commodification necessitates a rupture of both 
the ecological and social relations they embody (2004: 318).  Because of the centrality 
of seeds in the production process, the development and expansion of genetically 
engineered seeds has become a central corporate strategy for extending the agro-
industrial model and reproducing patterns of capital accumulation.  
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As the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate, the WDR’s ‘agriculture for 
development’ agenda advances the agro-industrial model and strengthens the 
corporate food regime by promoting a marketized notion of agricultural 
multifunctionality that paradoxically exacerbates energy, food, and climate crises by 
extending commodity relations and displacing locally situated knowledges.  A 
marketized notion of multifunctionality has two central characteristics.  First, it 
assumes the centrality of markets as the mode of organizing production, distribution, 
and consumption of multiple environmental and social needs and services.  Food, 
energy, and environmental crises are attributed to productive inefficiencies, 
technological limitations, or ineffective political organization (i.e. as an impediment to 
free market functioning), thus concealing the role of capitalism as a source of these 
crises.  Accordingly, the second feature of marketized multifunctionality is the 
emphasis on technology as a solution to food, energy, and environmental crises.  
Biotechnology, for instance, is presumed to increase the fungibility of agricultural 
products for transformation into food, fuel, or fiber while the expansion of markets for 
biofuels, carbon, and environmental services offer new avenues for capital 
investments. 
However, the WDR’s emphasis on corporate-driven economic development 
undermines the stated goals of reducing smallholder poverty and supporting 
sustainable agriculture (specifically harnessing the multiple functions of agriculture to 
promote food, energy and climate security).  In this vision, there is no future for 
peasant agriculture except either to be integrated into corporate value chains or to 
migrate out of agriculture – two of the three ‘pathways out of poverty.’   
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EPISTEMIC TENSIONS AND THE ‘PLACE’ OF AGRICULTURE: COMPETING VIEWS 
OF MULTIFUNCTIONALITY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRIBUSINESS, AND 
SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE 
The WDR on Multifunctionality, Biotechnology, and Agribusiness 
One of the stated goals of both the WDR and the IAASTD is to use agriculture to 
serve multiple functions in society, including food and energy security, reducing 
poverty, and mitigating climate change.  However, their conceptions of 
operationalizing multifunctionality with regard to these stated goals are fundamentally 
different.   
In the WDR’s conception of multifunctionality, the market – as facilitated by 
agribusiness – coordinates agro-inputs that ensure climate adaptation, productivity 
gains, and fungible products to meet multiple functions in agriculture and output 
markets for the transformation, allocation, and distribution of fuel, food, fiber, carbon, 
or environmental services.  Central to the ‘agriculture for development’ agenda is the 
idea that “the private sector drives the organization of value chains that bring the 
market to smallholders and commercial farms” (2008: 8).22  In the forward to the 
WDR, Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, identifies the key drivers of the 
agriculture for development agenda.  As he states, 
 
rapidly expanding domestic and global markets; institutional 
innovations in markets, finance, and collective action; and revolutions 
in biotechnology and information technology all offer exciting 
opportunities to use agriculture to promote development (2008: xiii).  
 
While the WDR constructs poor smallholder farmers and “less-favored areas” as 
objects for development, technological intervention and market-integration are the 
                                                
22 The Bank reproduces neoliberal discourse when it claims; “the private sector drives the organization 
of value chains that bring the market to smallholders and commercial farms.  The state – through 
enhanced capacity and new forms of governance – corrects market failures, regulates competition, and 
engages strategically in public-private partnerships to promote competitiveness in the agribusiness 
sector and support the greater inclusion of smallholders and rural workers.  In this emerging vision, 
agriculture assumes the prominent role in the development agenda” (2008: 8).   
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primary means and end of the WDR’s agrarian transition.  This conception privileges 
agriculture’s economic functions, especially the extension of agribusiness, above all 
other functions.  The WDR’s promotion of biotechnology and market integration 
implies that genetic modifications of seeds can unlock the social, environmental, and 
economic potentials of agriculture, and that market signals guide the allocation and 
distribution of food, fuel, and environmental services as facilitated through corporate 
value chains. 
For the WDR, biotechnology is the avenue for making agriculture multifunctional.  
Biotechnology, in this model, holds the promise of mitigating climate change, 
increasing food production, producing renewable energy, and reducing smallholder 
poverty while simultaneously reducing agriculture’s ecological footprint.23  
Productivity gains via biotechnology are a prominent feature of the ‘agriculture for 
development’ agenda.  In the Bank’s own words: 
 
The world is poised for another technological revolution in agriculture 
using the new tools of biotechnology to deliver significant yield gains.  
Already100 million hectares of crops, or about 8 percent of the cropped 
area, are sown with transgenic seeds…biotechnology applications using 
genomics and other tools are not controversial, and their declining costs 
and wider application should ensure continuing yield gains through 
better resistance to disease and tolerance for drought and other stresses 
(2008: 67). 
 
According to this logic, the production of drought and disease resistant plant 
varieties through biotechnology allows smallholders to increase their income via 
productivity gains.  The emphasis here is on the necessity (and purported benefits) of 
marketizing agriculture.  Using Bt cotton in India as a model of success, the report 
claims that biotechnologies “have the potential to enhance the competitiveness of 
                                                
23 “With growing resource scarcity,” the WDR claims, “future food production depends more than ever 
on increasing crop yields and livestock productivity” (2008: 67).  In the Bank’s framing, “the world 
food supply requires close monitoring and new investments to speed productivity growth, make 
production systems more sustainable, and adapt to climate change” (ibid: 69). 
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market-oriented smallholders…” (2008: 158).  The benefits and potential of these 
technologies are framed as a “win-win-win” situation: according to the WDR, 
“[transgenic insect-resistant cotton] has reduced yield losses, increased farmer profits, 
and greatly reduced pesticide use for millions of smallholders” (ibid:158).  In this 
analysis, biotechnology was the ‘magic bullet’ that allowed Indian cotton farmers to 
profit and save the environment simultaneously.  Biotechnologies, as argued in the 
WDR, can make agriculture more resilient and can achieve social and ecological goals 
by increasing productivity.24 
The WDR argues that “continuing progress” in developing sustainable agriculture 
entails “extending benefits of R&D to agriculture-based countries and less-favored 
regions…[and that] these technological innovations…must be combined with 
institutional innovations to ensure that input and output markets, financial services, 
and farmer organizations are in place for broad-based productivity growth” (2008: 
176).  Accordingly, biotechnology is central to achieving the multiple goals of 
sustainability, climate mitigation, and reducing poverty through productivity gains, but 
must be accompanied by “building input [and] output markets and linking farmers to 
those markets” (2008: 153).25  Following from this logic, the WDR views agriculture 
predominantly in its productive and economic capacity.  Sustainable agriculture is 
                                                
24 As stated therein, “The low productivity of most less-favored areas requires major new technology 
breakthroughs to secure profitability, reverse resource degradation, and improve livelihoods…  
Improved pest and disease resistance is particularly important to stabilize yields and make farming 
systems more resilient” (2008: 193). 
 
25 The WDR explains, “Progress in improving seed and fertilizer distribution systems will not be 
sustainable, however, unless there is strong, effective demand for both inputs, assured only as long as 
investment in seed and fertilizer is profitable for farmers.  That will be the case only if they have access 
to reliable markets for selling their products at remunerative prices.  Building input markets must go 
hand-in-hand with building output markets and linking farmers to those markets” (2008: 153).  And 
later in the report, the WDR says, “Continuing progress, especially in extending benefits of R&D to 
agriculture-based countries and less-favored regions elsewhere, depends on research in these 
environments for improving crop, soil, water, and livestock management and for developing more 
sustainable and resilient agricultural systems.  These technological innovations, often location specific, 
must be combined with institutional innovations to ensure that input and output markets, financial 
services, and farmer organizations are in place for broad-based productivity growth” (2008: 176).  
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conceived of in reductionist and mechanical terms where inputs and outputs can be 
substituted and manipulated to meet specific goals.  Therefore, drought resistant seeds, 
biofortification, zero tillage production, and precision agriculture are some of the 
WDR’s proposals to maximize the multifunctionality of agriculture via 
biotechnology.26  Problematically, these “sustainable” farming techniques are capital 
intensive relying on the extension of agro-industrial input and output markets.  Since 
one of the primary functions of tilling soil in agro-ecosystems is to disturb the 
reproductive cycle of invasive weeds (a form of weed management), ‘zero tillage 
agriculture’ relies on other methods of weed management, specifically increasing the 
use of herbicides and herbicide resistant genetically engineered seeds.27  This is 
consistent with the WDR’s repeated assertion that “the green revolution has been one 
of the major success stories of development,” and hence, the WDR’s plan to extend 
this “slow magic” to Africa (2008: 159).  The green revolution, according to the 
WDR, enhanced the multifunctionality of agriculture as it “met the world’s demand 
for food and reduced hunger and poverty [and] by dramatically slowing the expansion 
of cultivated area, agricultural intensification has also preserved forests, wetlands, 
biodiversity, and the ecosystem services provided” (2008: 180).  
                                                
26 “Other knowledge-based improvements in management that are win-win for farmers include using 
pest-resistant varieties, better timing and application of fertilizer and water, precision farming (using 
geographic information systems) and low-tillage farming” (2008: 188).  The WDR also claims that 
“Biofortification is enhancing staple crop varieties and improving diet quality with higher levels of 
vitamins and minerals through conventional crop-breeding and biotechnology…[and that] In the future, 
agriculture will continue to play a central role in tackling the problem of food insecurity.  It can 
maintain and increase global food production, ensuring food availability.  It can be the primary means 
to generate income for the poor, securing their access to food.  And through new and improved crop 
varieties, it can improve diet quality and diversity and foster the link between food security and 
nutrition security” (2008: 95). 
27 Tilling practices serve many functions in traditional and small-scale agroecological management 
systems.  In contrast, large-scale monoculture farming employs tilling practices that degrade soils and 
release carbon (Gliessman 2000; Pretty 2006, 2002; Altieri 1995; Altieri and Nichols 2009).  Thus, 
focusing promoting zero tillage for smallholder farmers is not only misguided, but also environmentally 
harmful.   
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The WDR proposes a number of so-called ‘win-win situations’ that are premised 
on technology transfers (genetically engineered seeds) and new markets for 
environmental services,28 including the extension of carbon trading to agricultural 
practices.  In calling on the international community to “climate-proof the farming 
systems of the poor,” the WDR prioritizes productivity gains through the development 
of drought resistant seeds, and increasing smallholder incomes through carbon trading 
schemes and payments for environmental services.  For example, the ‘win-win’ 
strategies of technological transfers are supposed to allow “poor African farmers” to 
increase yields on marginal and degraded lands, preserve the environment, and create 
new agro-input markets for agribusiness.  In sum, the WDR prescriptions for 
mitigating and adapting to climate change do not historicize the root causes of the 
problem, including the deepening metabolic rift of agro-industrialization29 which 
increases the spatial distance between production and consumption of food (a 
combination displacing farmers and growing urban slums) and intensifies the temporal 
features of production by replacing natural cycles with fossil fuel derived agro-inputs, 
increased deforestation for monoculture commodity production (largely to feed 
livestock, but also for agrofuels), and the historically constituted patterns of resource 
extraction from the global South that undergirds the energy intensive high-
consumption lifestyles in the global North.  Consequently, the WDR does not deal 
with ‘ecological unequal trade’ and the global North’s carbon debt (Martinez-Alier 
2002).  While the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is 
disproportionately a result of ecologically destructive forms capitalist development in 
                                                
28 “Some [less-favored lands], especially upland and forest areas, also protect watersheds, regulate water 
flows in major river basin ecosystems, sequester large amounts of carbon above and below ground, and 
are host to a rich array of biodiversity.  Few of these environmental benefits are valued in the market 
place” (WDR 2008: 190).  
29 Including energy-intensive food systems in which agro-industrial food production consumes large 
amounts of fossil fuel derived inputs as well as releases carbon in the form of deforestation caused by 
expanding monoculture production and the fossil fuel consumption of transporting food internationally. 
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Europe and the US and corresponding resource imperialism which fueled economic 
growth and reproduced capital accumulation, the proposed technological and market 
fixes proposed in the WDR not only obscures these historical processes, but also 
reconstitutes them as a form of green capitalist development.  
Furthermore, focusing on technological interventions devalues tacit knowledges of 
peasant farmers and their abilities to adapt to climatic variability through 
agroecological farming techniques.  The technological fix relies on corporate 
agribusiness and market solutions that disembed economies from the cultural 
knowledge necessary for dealing with ecological change.  While traditional agro-
ecological practices sustain ecological processes through historically constituted 
cultural knowledges of local environmental conditions, technological interventions 
proposed in the ‘agriculture for development agenda’ express a western scientific 
hubris (where the superiority of western technology is assumed) and promotes a 
uniform and universal solution to ecological crises.  From this standpoint, agriculture 
is perceived as a mechanistic process of inputs and outputs disembedded from cultural 
relations and local ecosystems, and thus, multifunctional agriculture is a technical 
challenge that can be achieved through biotechnologies.  In contrast, culturally and 
ecologically embedded knowledges have been, and continue to be, a foundation for 
resilient and multifunctional agro-ecosystems (Altieri 1995; Gliessman 2000; Pretty 
2006, 2002; Netting 1993).30  Thus, the Bank’s proposal to address climate change by 
integrating peasant farmers in global commodity relations, either by instituting the 
technological treadmill or incorporating them in the carbon market, displaces 
historically and culturally constituted knowledges of smallholder farmers, which are 
crucial to sustainable, multifunctional agriculture that can restore ecological processes.  
                                                
30 For examples of sustainable agro-ecosystems based on traditional knowledges and practices see 
Gliessman 2000, Altieri 1995, Pretty 2006, Rosset 2000, and Netting 1993. 
53 
Although the WDR recognizes the environmental problems of intensive and 
extensive agriculture, it frames these problems as the result of “failures to manage 
externalities,” as opposed to a systematic problem inherent in the agro-industrial 
model.  As such, the WDR recommends further marketization of agriculture, including 
the privatization of productive resources, in order to deal with environmental problems 
(2008: 195).31  Even in countries with “poor agroecological conditions” the WDR 
argues, “agricultural intensification will also be critical for reversing the degradation 
of natural resources, especially land and forests, as basis for sustainable agricultural 
growth,” and that poverty reduction will “depend increasingly on the poor connecting 
to these new growth processes, either as smallholders or as laborers” (2008: 35-36).  
In encouraging intensive agriculture, the WDR’s model of multifunctional agriculture 
recycles fundamental problems as solutions.  As such, the WDR gives backing to the 
corporate food regime in which agribusiness coordinates the production and 
distribution of agricultural services, including food, fuel, carbon sequestration, and 
other environmental benefits.  For the WDR, the functions of agriculture – whether 
food, fuel, or climate mitigation – are characterized by their monetary exchange 
values, in which agriculture produces a wide range of commodities that can and 
should be valued within the market.  
                                                
31 “Getting the incentives right,” according to the WDR, “is the first step towards sustainability.  
Improving natural resource management in both intensive and extensive farming areas requires 
removing price and subsidy policies that send the wrong signals to farmers, strengthening property 
rights, providing long-term support to natural resource management, and developing instruments to help 
manage increased climate risks” (2008: 198-99).  The incentives that the Bank appears to be talking 
about here are incentives for the adoption of new technologies.  As they say in the proceeding 
paragraph, “Better technologies and better ways of managing water and modern farm inputs are now 
available to make intensive farming more sustainable” (2008: 199).  What are lacking in their eyes are 
the appropriate market mechanisms for the transmission of these technologies.  Accordingly, 
“overcoming environmental problems in agriculture requires a good understanding of private incentives 
of individual resource users and ways to manage resources more successfully from society’s point of 
view.  Many factors affect private incentives for managing resources, including information, prices, 
subsidies, interest rates, market access, risk, property rights, technology, and collective action” (2008: 
181). 
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Accordingly, the marketized conception of multifunctionality presented in the 
WDR intensifies the metabolic rift of agro-industrialization by encouraging the 
commercialization of smallholder agriculture in which smallholder farmer practices 
and knowledges are replaced with genetically engineered seeds (and other agro-inputs) 
and are integrated into corporate values chains that distribute ecological services 
through carbon markets, specialty foods for European consumers, or biofuels for 
automobiles.     
 
The IAASTD on Multifunctionality, Biotechnology, and Agribusiness 
 
By definition, the principle of multifunctionality in agriculture refers to 
agriculture that provides food products for consumers, livelihoods and 
incomes for producers, and a range of public and private goods and 
services for citizens and the environment, including ecosystem 
functions (IAASTD 2008: 23). 
 
 In contrast to the WDR, the IAASTD views food sovereignty, local 
knowledges, and agroecological management as foundational to multifunctional 
agriculture and key to the development of sustainable livelihoods, energy, and 
ecosystems.  As a concept, food sovereignty provides alternative principles for 
agrarian reform that, first and foremost, conceptualize food as a human right and food 
and agricultural systems as culturally and geographically situated public goods (as 
opposed to market commodities).  The principles of food sovereignty are rooted in a 
multifunctional conception of agriculture where the goals of agricultural development 
are to provide “adequate, affordable, healthy, tasty, and culturally appropriate food” 
for everyone via local markets and production, supporting the livelihood options for 
smallholder farmers, and to achieve “sustainable long-term management of productive 
natural resources (soil, water, genetic resources and other biodiversity) by rural 
peoples themselves” (Rosset 2006:68).   
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While the IAASTD does not denounce market integration, it views market-
oriented agriculture as subservient to food sovereignty and the maintenance of 
agroecosystems.32  These differences are evident in the IAASTD’s assessment of the 
green revolution and its conceptualization of agriculture, reflecting an epistemological 
break with the WDR.  The IAASTD argues, 
 
The formal [agricultural knowledge, science and technology] system is 
not well equipped to promote the transition toward sustainability.  
Current ways of organizing technology generation and diffusion will be 
increasingly inadequate to address emerging environmental challenges, 
the multifunctionality of agriculture, the loss of biodiversity, and 
climate change.  Focusing [agricultural knowledge, science and 
technology] systems and actors on sustainability requires a new 
approach and worldview…  It also requires a new approach in the 
knowledge base… (2008: 30). 
 
 In addition, the IAASTD argues that the “energy intensive and 
environmentally taxing” agro-industrial models will, in time, “both exacerbate demand 
for limited resources and damage long term productivity” (2008:45).  This de-
centering of the agro-industrial model serves as the starting point from which the 
IAASTD develops its conception of multifunctionality in agriculture as a means of 
meeting multiple contemporary crises.  In contrast to the technological reductionism 
presented in the WDR, the IAASTD calls for a shift to a new knowledge base within 
formal agricultural science that includes “the revalorization of traditional and local 
knowledge” as well as, “an interdisciplinary, holistic and system-based approach to 
knowledge production and sharing” (2008: 30).  
Specifically, multifunctionality depends on “local and traditional strategies for in 
situ conservation” according to the IAASTD, which “can be highly effective in 
managing the viability and diversity of seed, roots, tubers and animal species over 
                                                
32 “Formal AKST has typically focused on increased specialization of commodity production and not on 
optimizing the outcomes from dynamically evolving multifunctional systems involving biophysical and 
socioeconomic components” (IAASTD 2008: 23). 
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generations,” and in turn provides “local options and capacity for adaptive response 
that are essential for meeting the challenges of climate change” (2008:71).  In 
divergence to the WDR’s call for agricultural intensification via biotechnologies and 
agro-input markets, the IAASTD promotes local management of “agroecosystems that 
both improve productivity and replenish ecosystem services” (2008: 45).  In fact, the 
IAASTD claims that “agroecosystems of even the poorest societies have the potential 
through ecological agriculture and IPM33 to meet or significantly exceed yields 
produced by conventional methods, reduce the demand for land conversion for 
agriculture, restore ecosystem services (particularly water), reduce the use of and need 
for synthetic fertilizers derived from fossil fuels, and the use of harsh insecticides and 
herbicides” (2008:43).  Far from the technological optimism presented in the WDR’s 
idea of a marketized multifunctionality, the IAASTD views the practices and 
knowledges of local people to be central to obtaining a multifunctional agriculture.34 
Accordingly, sustainable agriculture in the IAASTD is premised upon the long-
term health and functioning of agroecosystems and the culturally embedded 
knowledges that maintain these systems.  As such, agro-industrial technologies play a 
secondary and subordinate role in the maintenance of ecological integrity.  The 
IAASTD’s sustainability principles diverge from the WDR by promoting a reduction 
of agrochemical inputs, efficient use of energy, water, and land (“not only as in 
precision agriculture, but also as in agroecology”), diversification of agricultural 
systems, “agroecological management approaches,” the “internalization of the 
environmental costs of unsustainability,” and supporting “traditional and local 
                                                
33 Integrated Pest Management. 
34 In premising its conception of multifunctionality on local knowledge, the IAASTD argues, 
“Traditional and local knowledge co-evolve with changes in their material and non-material 
environment.  Any internal and external forces and drivers that threaten the loss of the material basis of 
traditional and local cultures and identities necessarily threaten traditional and local knowledge” 
(2008:78). 
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technical knowledge to manage soil fertility, crop and livestock genetic diversity and 
conserve natural resources” (2008: 29). 
 The IAASTD states its concerns about the ability of “modern biotechnology” to 
meet social and ecological goals as it has “developed in too narrow a context to meet 
its potential to contribute to the small and subsistence farmer,” and that 
“[bio]technologies in and of themselves cannot achieve sustainability and 
development goals” (2008:42).  Furthermore, the IAASTD argues that biotechnology 
and the privatization of seed systems threaten to undermine multifunctionality and 
local knowledge that are foundational to food security.  The report argues,  
 
As privatization fuels a transfer of knowledge away from the commons, 
there is a contraction both in crop diversity and numbers of local 
breeding specialists.  In many parts of the world women play this role, 
and thus a risk exists that privatization may lead to women losing 
economic resources and social standing as their plant breeding 
knowledge is appropriated.  At the same time, entire communities run 
the risk of losing control of their food security (2008:44). 
 
This analysis problematizes the role of agribusiness in creating social and 
ecological crises, implying that corporate-led development strategies reinforce unequal 
global power relations via processes of accumulation by dispossession.  Instead of 
assuming that poverty, hunger, and ecological degradation are caused by a lack of 
technology and market integration, the IAASTD reverses the equation, arguing that, in 
part, food insecurity and ecological degradation are a product of technological and 
market interventions through which corporations appropriate common resources and 
knowledges.35  Therefore, while the WDR places support behind technological 
                                                
35 As stated in the IAASTD, “The uneven distribution of productive natural resources coupled with the 
lack of access to resources and fair markets for small-scale producers and women in agriculture, results 
in extreme inequality and increasing poverty…millions of poor people and women in much of [the 
global South] contend with unequal production and market relationships on a daily basis.  Current 
inequality is exacerbated by the fact that [North America and Europe] dominate agricultural and rural 
development resources as well as formal knowledge generation in [agricultural knowledge, science and 
technology]. For example, businesses within [North America and Europe] have a powerful impact on 
global consumer demand; they obtain and profit, directly or indirectly, from commodities, landraces 
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interventions and western agribusiness, the IAASTD subordinates the interests of 
agribusiness to local communities and agroecological sustainability.  Stating its 
concern over the “potential genetic contamination in centers of origin,” the IAASTD 
endorses the precautionary principle with regard to biotechnology as a starting point 
for development policy (2008: 30).36  As stated therein, of central importance is, 
 
Democratically evaluating existing and emerging technologies such as 
transgenic crops, first and second generation biofuels, and 
nanotechnologies to ascertain their environmental, health and social 
impacts.  Long-term assessments are needed for technologies that 
require considerable financial investment and risk to adopters, such as 
biotechnology and Green Revolution-type technologies (high external 
inputs).  It is important that impacts and applications of alternative 
technologies are also examined and that independent comparative 
assessments (i.e., comparing transgenic with currently available 
agroecological approaches such as biological control) are conducted 
(2008: 29). 
 
This position contrasts starkly with the WDR’s ‘agriculture for development’ 
agenda, whereby the superiority of western technologies and the need for external 
intervention is presumed.  The IAASTD argues for the democratic rights of farmers 
and farming communities to determine the appropriateness of technologies.  
Moreover, the practices and knowledges of smallholder farmers are given priority over 
technological interventions in order to achieve social and ecological objectives in 
development policy.  Importantly, these principles espoused in the IAASTD provide 
legitimacy to development alternatives premised on the local control of food systems. 
The conflicts apparent in both the assessment and proposed solutions of the WDR 
and IAASTD reflect competing epistemic positions within dominant development 
discourse.  In implicating the ‘development industry’ and corporate agribusiness in the 
                                                                                                                                       
and other valuable genetic resources (stored ex situ in other countries), beneficial organisms for 
biocontrol programs, immigrant labor and have legal and institutional capacities such as intellectual 
property rights, standards and market regulations… (2008: 24). 
36 The report recognizes the “importance of assessing both the potential environmental, health and 
social impacts of any new technology, and the appropriate implementation of regulatory frameworks as 
a principled matter of precaution” (2008: 30). 
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production and perpetuation of smallholder poverty and proposing a revalorization of 
smallholder agroecological knowledge as the basis for multifunctional agriculture, the 
IAASTD poses a sharp critique of the WDR’s ‘agriculture for development’ agenda.  
These epistemic tensions are further exposed in how both reports envision the place 
and role of smallholder agriculture in meeting development goals and addressing 
contemporary crises.     
 
The WDR on Smallholder Agriculture 
In contradiction to the WDR’s proclaimed promotion of ‘win-win’ strategies for 
smallholder agriculture and the environment, the WDR’s proposed extension of the 
agro-industrial model, characterized by energy- and capital-intensive export 
agriculture, sanctions depeasantization via accumulation by dispossession.  
Accumulation by dispossession, as a methodological lens of historical capitalist 
transformations, illuminates the various ways that specific historical moments of 
capitalist development forcefully or coercively incorporate non-capitalist social 
relations, as well as the appropriation of public assets, into global commodity relations 
as a strategy for reproducing capital accumulation (Harvey 2003; Glassman 2006).  
The transformation of social relations to commodity or market relations entails a 
disembedding of markets from their social and material basis (Polanyi 2001).  The 
WDR’s agriculture for development agenda endorses the commercialization of 
smallholder agriculture by tying farmers to agro-input and output markets, and also 
encourages other farmers (ones that are out-competed by ‘entrepreneurial farmers’) to 
migrate to urban areas as a pathway out of poverty (proletarianization).  As a result, 
the ‘agriculture for development agenda’ espouses transforming social and ecological 
relations of smallholder farmers into commodity relations for purposes of economic 
growth (capital accumulation).  This model necessarily presumes the “successful 
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migration out of agriculture” (WDR 2008: 8) whereby peasants are viewed as 
inefficient barriers to growth and the productive efficiencies of agribusiness are 
believed to serve as a vehicle for ‘sustainable’ economic growth. 
The WDR continually promotes the so-called “new agriculture” that exploits high-
value export crops in horticulture, livestock, and vegetables as a way to capture the 
growth potentials of new markets and meet specialized consumer demand in Europe.  
Changing international tastes, the WDR claims, “open new markets for a wide range 
of higher-value agricultural products and propel the evolution of the marketing system 
in many developing countries, with the entry and rapid growth of supermarket chains 
and the food processing and food service industries” (2008: 124).  Additionally, the 
WDR recommends that agricultural-based countries focus on “agro-based clusters” 
where firms in specific geographical areas coordinate and compete in servicing 
dynamic international markets such as the market in non-traditional exports, or the 
“new agriculture” (2008: 211).  By continuing to espouse export-oriented development 
strategies, the WDR’s proposal for agricultural growth is premised upon the 
exploitation of the international division of labor, where agriculture-based countries of 
the global South realize their ‘comparative advantage’ (cheap land, labor, and 
resources) by exporting raw materials and food for consumption in the industrialized 
countries in the global North.  
One of the ‘new dynamic export markets’ the WDR supports is the global market 
in biofuels.  Although the WDR cautiously supports biofuel projects (acknowledging 
some of the political controversies37), the WDR argues that with technological 
advances, biofuel production can open new markets for smallholder farmers while 
meeting energy security and mitigating climate change.  In their words, “promising 
new opportunities for mitigating climate change and creating large new markets for 
                                                
37 Such as diverting food crops for fuel, resulting in an increase in food prices. 
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agriculture have emerged through the production of biofuels, stimulated by high 
energy prices” (2008: 17).  Specifically, the WDR argues that advances in 
biotechnology, which can improve the efficiency of converting feedstock into fuel, 
and creating market incentives through carbon trading, are the key factors for meeting 
the energy and climate potentials of agriculture.  As such, the WDR’s position on 
biofuel production epitomizes their marketized conception of multifunctionality, upon 
which the future of smallholder agriculture is dependent and marginal to the creation 
of corporate managed input and output markets.   
The contradictions between the WDR’s stated goals of supporting smallholder 
agriculture and their reliance on the agro-industrial model are particularly evident in 
its focus area titled “Agribusiness for Development.”  While the WDR articulates its 
concern over corporate concentration and argues for the creation of small and medium 
size agribusinesses to stimulate wealth generation in the countryside, it neglects to 
mention how processes of consolidation and concentration occur, especially during a 
time when neoliberal policies facilitate the internationalization of capital, which 
transcends boundaries and supersedes the ability of states to regulate national 
economies.  During the post WWII international food regime, agriculture in 
developing countries was restructured towards agro-exporting of specialty crops and 
importing food staples from heavily subsidized and increasingly concentrated grain 
corporations (Friedmann 1990, 1992; McMichael 2004).38  Subsidy regimes and 
international trade policies facilitated this international trend of corporate 
consolidation and food dependency such that four corporations currently dominate the 
global grain market: Cargill, Bunge, ADM, and ConAgra control 80% of global grain 
                                                
38 Many countries with high levels of food insecurity are often exporters of luxury foods or tropical 
commodities, such as the countries that constitute Central America, export coffee, sugar, pineapples, 
banana, cocoa, and beef, yet food insecurity and hunger persist in these countries (Tucker 2000; Faber 
1993). 
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trade (Heffernan 2000; Murphy 2008).  This corporate food regime has no allegiance 
to national development or public welfare, but is instead driven by the uneven 
geography of demand and profits.  Corn ethanol refineries and the seed industry in the 
US are also good examples of corporate consolidation.  Both started with small and 
medium size businesses, but as the technology and markets were established large 
agribusiness capitals bought out these small businesses and consolidated both of these 
industries (Murphy 2008; Heffernan 2000; Kloppenburg 2004).  While the WDR 
argues that “linking the local economy to broader markets by reducing transaction 
costs, investing in infrastructure, and providing business services and market 
intelligence are critical” to the establishment of agribusiness, it does not support state 
interventions in regulating foreign corporations (2008: 18).  Creating agribusiness 
initiatives in the global South by design creates in-roads for transnational capital.  As 
the markets for agro-inputs are dominated by US and European corporations, the 
WDR’s proposal for creating a good investment climate implies that agricultural-
based countries should subsidize the entry of transnational capital by constructing the 
demand for agro-chemicals as well as market infrastructure to facilitate agricultural 
exports.  The expansion of proprietary genetically engineered seeds, in particular, 
creates input dependencies amongst smallholder farmers, as genetically engineered 
seeds rely on the simultaneous application of fertilizers and pesticides in order to 
maximize yields.39  Incorporating smallholder farmers into corporate-dominated input 
and output markets instigates accumulation by dispossession as the productive 
resources and associated knowledges of smallholder farmers are substituted with 
capital-intensive external inputs.40 
                                                
39 For more on impacts of biotechnology with regard to global North/South relations, see Kloppenburg 
2004, and Pistorius and van Wijk 1999. 
40 While small and medium size business will accrue all the entrepreneurial risks, agribusiness will 
consolidate the successes (Amanor 2009).   
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The WDR makes two admonitions that expose the unstated reality of the 
‘agriculture for development’ agenda.  First, the WDR acknowledges “economies of 
scale in the “new agriculture” are often the key for obtaining inputs, technology, and 
information and in getting products to the market (2008: 91).  As agriculture becomes 
more technology driven and access to consumers is mediated by agroprocessors and 
supermarkets, economies of scale will pose major challenges for the future 
competiveness of smallholders” (2008: 91-92).  Secondly, the WDR acknowledges 
that attracting private investments for agro-input and output markets “depend on the 
potential profitability of these activities” (2008: 150).  The WDR’s support of the 
‘new agriculture’ based on high-value exports is thus contingent upon the ability to 
attract foreign capital.  This includes tying smallholder farmers into circuits of capital 
where farmers obtain loans to purchase improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, 
specialize in monoculture production of one export crop, and sell their produce 
through corporate value chains.  Yet integrating farmers into competitive international 
markets and increasing their reliance on capital-intensive agro-inputs, in tandem with 
instituting privatized land markets facilitate the consolidation of land into the hands of 
wealthy farmers (or what the WDR calls ‘entrepreneurial farmers’) as market-based 
competition pits smallholder farmers against large-scale farmers.   
The WDR admits, “not all smallholders will be able to farm their way out of 
poverty.  For those with limited access to resources and market opportunities, 
improving productivity in subsistence agriculture can allow them to secure their food 
consumption and health and eventually move into market-oriented farming or other, 
more remunerative jobs” (2008: 234, emphasis added).  Here, the WDR condones the 
process of differentiation through which the competitive forces of market mechanisms 
pit smallholder farmers against one another.  Capital endowed farmers are presumed, 
and encouraged to consolidate land by out competing other smallholder farmers.  In 
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the words of the WDR, “heterogeneity in the smallholder sector implies that a group 
of entrepreneurial smallholders is likely to respond when markets offer new 
opportunities.  Improved access to assets, new technologies, and better incentives can 
allow more smallholders to become market participants in staples and high-value 
crops” (2008: 92).   
Consistent with dominant approaches to market integration, the WDR’s proposed 
productivity revolution and export-led ‘new agriculture’ implies the transformation or 
eventual elimination of smallholder farms.  As the WDR bluntly argues, agricultural 
policies should pursue “multiple pathways out of poverty, [including] shifting to high-
value agriculture, decentralizing nonfarm economic activity to rural areas, and 
providing assistance to help move people out of agriculture (2008: 2, emphasis 
added).  As clarified in the WDR’s promotion of the commercialization of smallholder 
agriculture and corporate led development, the ‘agriculture for development’ agenda 
assumes that smallholder farmers are impediments to economic growth (as noted 
above).  The proliferation of industrial agriculture effectively replaces human labor 
and local knowledge with mechanization, biotechnology, and industrial chemicals, 
further deskilling and devalorizing smallholder agricultural practices.  By extending 
commodity relations via market integration into global value chains and the creation 
of agro-input markets, the WDR promotes a global corporate food regime that deepens 
and expands the historical processes of depeasantization via accumulation by 
dispossession. 
 
The IAASTD on Smallholder Agriculture 
 
Small-scale farmers, particularly women, play a key role in promoting 
sustainable methods of farming based on traditional knowledge and 
practices.  Women often possess knowledge of the value and use of 
local plant and animal resources for nutrition, health and income in 
their roles as family caretakers, plant gatherers, home gardeners, 
herbalists, seed custodians and informal plant breeders.  Moreover, 
65 
women often experiment with and adapt indigenous species and thus 
become experts in plant genetic resources (IAASTD 2008:78). 
 
 As illustrated in the above excerpt, the IAASTD has a very different conception 
of the relationship between smallholder agriculture, development, and the 
environment.  By arguing for a “democratization of knowledge production” moving 
beyond ‘formal science’ to include “the local and traditional knowledges…” it poses 
an epistemic challenge to the hegemonic position of the agro-industrial model within 
dominant development discourse (2008: 17).  The report also calls for “moving away 
from a linear technology transfer approach,” that predominantly benefited medium and 
large-scale farmers to the detriment of small-scale diversified farmers and 
multifunctional agriculture, and instead moving development policy towards engaging 
smallholder farmers in “priority setting and funding decisions” (2008:31).  Whereas 
the WDR focuses on external interventions to increase smallholder productivity and 
multifunctionality, the IAASTD views the cultural knowledges and practices of 
smallholder farmers as central to creating appropriate policies and solutions to social 
and ecological crises.  The report argues for policies that “enable resource-poor 
farmers to use their traditional and local technical knowledge to manage soil fertility, 
crop and livestock genetic diversity and conserve natural resource,” including 
adjusting intellectual property rights “to allow farmers to manage their seeds and 
germplasm resources as they wish” (2008: 29).  Posing an epistemic challenge to the 
WDR’s promotion of corporate-managed agro-input markets, the IAASTD espouses 
the rights of farmers to own and control the means of production that are essential to 
their livelihoods and agroecological functioning.  
As opposed to the deregulation of national agricultural policies for the purpose of 
inducing foreign investments (as the WDR supports), the IAASTD encourages an 
active regulatory state that upholds and defends the interests of smallholder farmers 
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and the environment against the unregulated expansion of agribusiness and 
biotechnologies.  The IAASTD calls on states and international institutions to “protect 
small-scale farmers from unfair competition including from often subsidized 
commodities produced under conditions of economies of scale,” as well as to provide 
protection against proprietary agribusiness by “creating or strengthening conditions 
that can guarantee farmers’ rights to choose, select, and exchange seeds that are 
culturally and locally appropriate,” and by removing the “monopoly privileges” 
granted to seed corporations through intellectual property regimes (2008:32). In 
contrast to the WDR’s recommendation of privatizing land tenure and other 
productive resources, the IASSTD argues that land reform policies should better 
understand and uphold “communal ownership” and “communal exchange” systems 
(2008: 32).  The IAASTD recommends land reform to promote smallholder-
diversified farms as a way to address the “displacement of small-scale farmers, 
campesinos and indigenous people to urban centers or to marginal lands in the 
agricultural frontier” (2008: 32).  In this vision, supportive smallholder policies ensure 
the rights of communities and farmers to access land and productive resource and 
protect these rights from corporate privatization schemes.  Supporting smallholder-
diversified agriculture serves as the basis for meeting future sustainability and social 
justice goals.  
While food security for the WDR entails market integration and increasing 
productivity via technological interventions, the IAASTD views food security as 
dependent upon the promotion of smallholder agriculture and the maintenance and 
reproduction of local agroecological knowledge.  As such, it encourages development 
agencies and agricultural research institutions to “value farmer knowledge, 
agricultural and natural biodiversity, farmer-managed medicinal plants, local seed 
systems, and common pool resource management regimes” (2008: 26).  Likewise, the 
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IAASTD recommends the “empowerment of women as repositories of knowledge 
about local ecosystems” within development policy as a way to support knowledge-
based multifunctionality, which is “fundamental to development and to adapting to a 
changing environment” (2008: 21).  Here, farmer knowledge along with local and 
community controlled food systems are central to the IAASTD’s vision of agricultural 
development.  As opposed to the technological and market interventions proposed by 
the WDR as a way to differentiate the countryside, the IAASTD envisions a central 
and important role of smallholder farmers in addressing social and ecological crises, 
arguing that the challenge today is to retool agricultural knowledge science and 
technology to improve the “livelihood options for the rural poor – especially landless 
and peasant communities…” (2008: 22).  Importantly, these recommendations validate 
the principles of food sovereignty in which communities have the right to determine 
their own food systems based on cultural and ecological integrity. 
 In promoting “participatory and democratic approaches” to knowledge, science, 
and technology, including the development of “innovative local networks” and 
institutional reforms that “enable formal [agricultural knowledge, science and 
technology] to partner effectively with small-scale producers, women, pastoralists, and 
indigenous and tribal peoples,”41 the IAASTD unsettles the epistemic foundation of 
the WDR’s ‘agriculture for development’ agenda (2008:30).  While the ‘agriculture 
for development’ agenda assumes a uniform and linear development trajectory in 
which (western) technological and market based interventions transform and 
differentiate the peasantry (into either commercial farmers or wage laborers) on the 
path towards industrialization, the IAASTD problematizes these premises by 
encouraging development agencies to recognize and learn from the “skills of local 
producers” and to recognize “multiple theoretical frameworks and development 
                                                
41 “… who are sources of environmental knowledge” (IAASTD 2008:30). 
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models,” including “a wide range of options” outside of the current agro-industrial 
model (2008:18, 21).  The IAASTD proposes to implement this shift in development 
practice by supporting the “institutionalization and affirmation of traditional and local 
knowledge” within national, regional, and international policy making frameworks 
(2008: 73).  The principles of food sovereignty play a central role in this schema, as 
illustrated by the support of a number of countries and projects that “have developed 
strategies… to institutionalize and affirm traditional and local knowledge for the 
combined goals of sustainable agricultural modernization, natural resource 
management, social justice and the improvement of well-being and livelihoods” (ibid: 
73). 
 
The WDR’s Agriculture for Development Agenda: Interests and Implications 
Based on Malthusian and market-based assumptions of development (described in 
Chapter One), the WDR promotes green revolution technologies as a response to 
hunger and food insecurity.  This has been a long-standing strategy of the World 
Bank, along with development agencies and practitioners at large (for elaborations, see 
Lappé et al 1998; Mitchell 2002; Goldman 2005; McMichael 2004).  It is no 
coincidence that this technical approach to agricultural development has the support of 
US and EU agribusiness, as these corporations continuously seek new markets for 
their agro-inputs and investments for research and development of new technologies.  
However, the technological interventions of green revolution projects (namely the use 
of synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides as well as the machinery to improve 
efficiency) have a poor environmental and social track record, including the 
contamination of fresh water, increased soil erosions and soil salinity, human and 
animal chemical exposure, reduction and contamination of ground water. (Kimbrell 
2002; Holt-Giménez 2006; Gliessman 2000).  Agricultural modernization projects in 
69 
the global South, such as the green revolution in Mexico and India, instigated 
processes of farmer differentiation as differential access to agricultural inputs and 
technology exacerbated economic disparities enabling large and capital-intensive 
farms to outcompete and displace small and medium scale farmers (Altieri 2009; Holt-
Giménez 2006).  In sum, the market framings of the WDR misconstrue both the 
problems and solutions to contemporary social and ecological crises, and conceal “the 
relations and processes underlying the corporate appropriation of agriculture” 
(McMichael 2009b: 284).  Rather than creating energy, food, and climate security, the 
WDR’s “agriculture for development agenda” entails the subordination of food and 
fuel sovereignty to market integration.  The WDR’s conception of multifunctionality, 
following the logic of green capitalist ideology, subordinates socio-ecological and 
culturally embedded knowledges by encouraging the commercialization of 
smallholder agriculture.  Likewise, the WDR’s support of utilizing biotechnology to 
increase the fungibility of agricultural commodities to increase multifunctionality 
reveals the ways in which the WDR sanctions the corporate food regime. 
While the WDR sanctions the extension of the agro-industrial model of production 
via a corporate food regime (premised on increasing dependence on cheap fossil fuel 
energy), the IAASTD problematizes the continuation of both the agro-industrial model 
and the dominant development paradigm.  The problem, according to the IAASTD, 
derives from an epistemic failure of development thinking as “existing specialization 
in the global agrifood system coupled with government investments and policies in 
production and trade, has led to a view of agriculture as an exclusively economic 
activity, measured in commodity-based, monetary terms” (2008: 23).  This 
problemization of the productivist paradigm is an epistemic intervention that 
challenges the WDR’s conception of food as a commodity and agriculture as a sector 
for commodity production.   
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Additionally, the IAASTD destabilizes western scientific knowledge as the 
dominant and most appropriate form of innovation for agricultural development, as 
well as uniform notions of progress and development.42  Instead the IAASTD revalues 
local knowledge and multiple theoretical and alternative development processes.43  
“We cannot escape our predicament,” the IAASTD argues, “by simply continuing to 
apply methodological individualism, i.e., by relying on the outcome of individual 
choices to achieve sustainable and equitable collective outcomes” (2008: 17).  Here, 
the IAASTD problematizes the dominant economistic approach to development 
policy, which places individual rationality (assuming the universality of a profit-
oriented market subject) at the center of the development model and argues for a more 
complex understanding of the interactions between political economic forces and 
varying cultural perceptions of development, rooted in ecological relations.  In arguing 
that solutions based solely from an economistic episteme will not be able to solve the 
multiple social and ecological crises we face today, the IAASTD unsettles the very 
epistemic foundation upon which the WDR is premised.   
The IAASTD’s emphasis on maintaining and supporting smallholder agriculture 
also challenges the growth fetishism of the dominant development paradigm, arguing 
that the predominance of economistic indicators of growth within dominant 
                                                
42 The IAASTD challenges the uniform agro-industrial model in arguing that “critical regional 
differences in agroecosystems, access to formal [science and technology] and diverse impacts on people 
and ecosystems, pose a challenge to the continuing dominance of a uniform type of formal [agricultural 
knowledge, science and technology]” (2008: 18). 
43 “An environment in which formal science and technology and local and traditional knowledge are seen as 
part of an integral [agricultural knowledge, science and technology] system is most likely to increase 
equitable access to technologies to a broad range of producers. Options to improve this integration include 
moving away from a linear technology transfer approach that benefited relatively well-off producers of major 
cash crops but had little success for small-scale diversified farms and poor and marginalized groups and paid 
little attention to the multifunctionality of agriculture.  Improvements are needed in engaging farmers in 
priority setting and funding decisions, and both in increasing collaboration with social scientists, and 
increasing participatory work in the core research institutions.  Networks among small-scale producers 
contribute to the exchange of experience and AKST, as do inter- and multidisciplinary programs, cross- 
disciplinary learning and scientific validation, involving both research and non-research actors, and 
recognizing the cultural identity of indigenous communities” (IAASTD 2008: 31). 
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development institutions is a main culprit of contemporary social and ecological 
crises.  The social and ecological crises are symptomatic of an epistemic crisis in 
development theory.  As such, the social and ecological crises of agro-
industrialization, according to the IAASTD, “[are a] part of an overall development 
model in which scientific knowledge is institutionalized in its utilitarian role, [and] 
resources are allocated to production systems that can show the highest economic 
returns to crop/commodity productivity” (2008:25).  In this historical moment 
characterized by multiple reinforcing crises, the epistemic tension within dominant 
development discourse is creating a discursive space for agrarian social movements to 
consolidate viable development alternatives premised on social and ecological justice 
and sustainability.  The IAASTD’s challenge to dominant development discourse is, in 
effect, legitimizing food and fuel sovereignty movements as it calls for a 
revalorization of smallholder agriculture and knowledges in their own right, rather 
than as subordinate to national development goals.   
 
Emerging Possibilities 
Published at the peak of the food crisis, these reports reflect epistemic tensions 
within the development agenda.  In critiquing the premises of the agro-industrial 
development model, the IAASTD poses an alternative framing and solutions to these 
crises.  At this historical moment of multiple reinforcing social and ecological crises, 
the IAASTD illuminates a decline in the legitimacy of market-oriented agriculture 
within dominant development discourse and an opportunity for development 
alternatives, such as those put forth by Via Campesina, to establish food sovereignty 
as a central feature of agrarian reform, the focus of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CRACKS, FISSURES, AND A POLITICS OF EMERGENCE?: 
ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW 
AGRARIAN QUESTION 
 
At a historical moment characterized by multiple social and ecological crises, the 
epistemic tension within dominant development discourse and the material and 
discursive interventions of corporate agribusiness and agrarian social movements 
represent a contemporary global ‘double movement’ (Polanyi 2001).44  With the 
legitimacy of the dominant development paradigm under scrutiny, this historical 
conjuncture opens the discursive space for “reframing the politics of development” 
and marks a moment of potential transition in the terms, conditions, and practices of 
the relations between agriculture and development (McMichael 2009c: 142).  While 
the WDR sanctions the discursive and material strengthening of the corporate food 
regime (exemplified in corporate agrofuel projects), agrarian social movements (such 
as La Via Campesina, MST, and variations of local food projects) are challenging and 
reimagining development along the lines of agroecology and food sovereignty.  In this 
chapter I examine two cases – corporate agrofuel projects45 that reflect the trajectory 
of the dominant development paradigm, and the food sovereignty movement that 
reflects the emerging potentials for development alternatives – to demonstrate the 
logical extensions of the WDR and IAASTD’s discursive approaches to agriculture 
and development.  I use corporate agrofuel projects in this final chapter as an 
illustration of the WDR’s conception of multifunctionality, and to draw out the 
                                                
44 While Polanyi wrote about the double movement largely within the confines of national borders, the 
breaching of territorial boundaries by transnational capital and global ecological crises (exemplified by 
climate change) and the rise of transnational social movements (such as La Via Campesina and the food 
sovereignty movement), illustrate how the dynamics of a contemporary double movement play out on a 
global scale.    
45 I use the term ‘corporate agrofuels’ to distinguish large-scale agrofuel projects and corporate driven 
agrofuel supply chains from other small scale, local, and/or community-based biofuel projects.  Not all 
biofuels are the same, however, the rapid global expansion of agrofuel projects over the past 5 years, is 
predominantly a corporate driven process with institutional support, which will be explained in this 
chapter (See GRAIN 2007).   
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political and material implications of the agriculture for development agenda.  I argue 
that the marketized conception of multifunctionality espoused in the WDR condones 
corporate agrofuel projects that utilize new biotechnologies to enhance the fungibility 
of agriculture to meet emerging market demands for fuel and carbon.  In contrast, La 
Via Campesina illustrates an alternative conception of multifunctionality and agrarian 
development that extends and amplifies the contestations to the dominant development 
paradigm presented in the IAASTD.  I employ Friedmann’s (2005) notion of 
transitions as a way of interpreting the epistemic and practical possibilities of this 
historical moment characterized by a global double movement of competing and 
divergent agrarian development paradigms.  Interpreting transitional moments 
between food regimes, Friedmann argues that new “food regimes emerge out of 
contests between social movements and powerful institutions” through which new 
rules and governing principles are negotiated and established (2005: 234).  
Importantly, in these moments of transition, social movements challenge dominant 
framings of social reality by naming, and thus making explicit, the implicit and 
contradictory rules of the hegemonic food regime (ibid: 235).  In this chapter, I apply 
this notion of transitional moments specifically to the struggles over development 
discourse and practice.     
This chapter also addresses the implications of these divergent models of 
agricultural organization and practice (agro-industrial and food sovereignty) with 
regard to contemporary reformulations of the agrarian question.  In the concluding 
section, I argue that this moment of potential transition implies a re-framing of the 
agrarian question in which the social and ecological significance of the ‘fate of the 
peasantry’ is becoming a more salient point of political contestation.  In politicizing 
the socio-ecological contradictions of corporate agribusiness, agrarian social 
movements draw attention to the ecological (‘cooling the planet’) and social (‘feeding 
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the world’) benefits of smallholder agroecological-based farming (McMichael 2008).  
In contrast to the original agrarian question formulated from the lens of capital 
accumulation, the new agrarian question, I argue in congruence with McMichael 
(2007, 2008, 2009e), is being framed through the lens of food sovereignty.  Through 
this reframing, agrarian social movements are politicizing the socio-ecological 
contradictions of the dominant development paradigm and reclaiming the political 
subjectivity of the peasantry from theoretical representations of the disintegration and 
political insignificance of peasant agriculture.  
 
COMPETING VISIONS AND EXPRESSIONS OF A CONTEMPORARY DOUBLE 
MOVEMENT: THE CORPORATE FOOD AND FUEL COMPLEX AND THE FOOD 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
[The double movement] can be personified as the action of two 
organizing principles in society, each of them setting itself specific 
institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using 
its own distinctive methods.  The one was the principle of economic 
liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, 
relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-
faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social 
protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as 
productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most 
immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market—
primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes—and 
using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other 
instruments of intervention as its method (Polanyi 2001:138). 
 
Polanyi employs the concept of the double movement to explain the political 
project of instituting economic liberalism in 19th century England, and the political 
resistance (‘social protection’) to the social and ecological disruptions of free market 
capitalism.  By organizing production through market mechanisms and transforming 
socio-ecological relations into commodity relations, the capitalist subordination of 
society to free-market relations, Polanyi dramatically argues, “disjoint[s] man’s 
relationships and threaten[s] his natural habitat with annihilation” (2001:44).  As the 
previous two chapters have demonstrated, the WDR reflects a discursive effort to 
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institutionalize and expand capitalist relations by extending corporate value chains and 
the agro-industrial model of production to the global South.46  However, the capitalist 
project of disembedding markets from the social and ecological fabric of society, 
Polanyi argues, is historically contingent on the relative strength of counter 
movements struggling to ‘protect society’ and to construct ‘alternative organizing 
principles for society’ and development (2001: 138).  This historical moment of social 
and ecological crises and the discursive and material contestations reveal the features 
of a contemporary double movement, embodied by agrofuel projects of the corporate 
food regime and the food sovereignty movement.  Whereas food, in the corporate 
agro-industrial paradigm, is a commodity valued in monetary terms, the food 
sovereignty paradigm conceptualizes food as an embodiment of social and ecological 
relations central to social reproduction and the sustainability of agro-ecological 
processes.   
In this section, I will first outline the characteristics of emerging corporate food 
and fuel commodity complexes.47  In order to assess the extent to which corporate 
agrofuel projects extend the negative social and ecological consequences of agro-
industrialization, I will focus on the expansion of commodity relations and the 
development of increasingly fungible commodities via biotechnology as well as the 
consolidation of corporate power in the global food economy by way of mergers, joint 
ventures, and increasing investments from industrial and energy capitals.  In the 
subsequent section, I will explore the discursive and political interventions of La Via 
                                                
46Polanyi explains how 19th century liberal discourse reframed social and ecological crises as a lack of 
economic liberalism as a way to legitimate further free market reforms.  He says, “The materialistic 
fallacy in regard to the nature of social and cultural catastrophe thus bolstered the legend that all the ills 
of the time had been caused by our lapse from economic liberalism” (2001:169).  Similarly, the WDR 
proposes to transform the socio-ecological relations of smallholder agriculture into corporate 
commodity relations, thus recycling problems as solutions. 
47 Corporate agrofuel projects serve as an expression of the WDR vision of agrarian transformation 
including the subordination of agriculture to capital via agro-industrialization and smallholder 
incorporation into corporate food and fuel value chains. 
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Campesina and the movement for food sovereignty.  These examples express the 
contours of a contemporary double movement. 
 
THE WDR AND CORPORATE FOOD AND FUEL COMMODITY COMPLEXES 
The WDR’s depoliticized framings of social and ecological crises and its 
marketized interpretations of multifunctionality, smallholder agriculture, and food 
security sanctions the corporate food regime and its agro-industrial model of 
development in which agribusiness mediates the production and distribution of agro-
inputs and outputs.  Meanwhile, energy and climate crises, in tandem with prevailing 
ideologies of green capitalist development, have served as a catalyst for biotechnology 
companies and agribusinesses as they present agrofuel production as a sustainable 
development strategy that addresses both energy and climate crises.48  As growing 
markets for agrofuel in the global North are creating new avenues for the industrial 
transformation of agriculture in the global South, the promotion of corporate-led 
development and biotechnologies in the WDR’s ‘agriculture for development’ agenda 
condones emerging food and fuel complexes.49  
Food and fuel commodity complexes are characterized by corporate control over 
agricultural research agendas (including large investments by energy and automobile 
                                                
48 According to the ADM website (www.adm.com) “Each day, the 28,000 people of Archer Daniels 
Midland Company transform crops such as corn, oilseeds, wheat and cocoa into food ingredients, 
animal feeds, and agriculturally derived fuels and chemicals.  With crop sourcing, transportation, 
storage, and processing assets in more than 60 countries, ADM connects farmers’ crops with the needs 
of the global marketplace… The world is expected to consume 55 percent more energy by 2030 than it 
did in 2005.  But with petroleum reserves declining and emissions from traditional fossil fuels 
increasing, there is a growing needs to draw upon cleaner, renewable, sustainable energy sources to 
meet rising global demand.  Today, biofuels such as ethanol and biodiesel are the only alternative 
transportation fuels available to consumers, and ADM is a leading producer of both” (10-12-2009).  
And Dupont claims on their website (www2.dupont.com) “Our mission is to deliver global nutrition 
through higher crop yields and healthier foods while developing solutions to help meet the world's 
energy needs” (10-12-2009). 
49 As markets for carbon credits and renewable energy in the global North are established through 
market-based climate change agreements, corporate agrofuel projects are expanding in the global South.  
See Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2009, and McMichael 2009b for more on the expansion of agrofuel 
production in the global South.   
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corporations at public universities), corporate alliances between agribusiness, energy 
and automobile industries (via joint ventures, collaborative partnerships, vertical and 
horizontal consolidation), and biotechnological innovations that create fungible 
commodities and extend the commodification of nature through research and 
development of second generation biofuels.50  Corporate agribusiness concentration in 
all the major first generation biofuel feedstock markets (soy, corn, palm oil, sugar) 
illustrates the corporate dominance and likely consolidation of global agrofuel 
markets.  For example, with the support of ethanol mandates, Archer Daniels Midland 
Company (ADM) is diversifying its commodity portfolio into fuels, estimating that a 
quarter of their profits will come from the agrofuel sector (Philpott 2007).  Similarly, 
Cargill has purchased the largest ethanol distillery in Brazil, and is now the leading 
exporter of sugar and soy out of Brazil (for food, fuel, and industrial processing).  
Cargill has also become a major player in Indonesia’s palm oil production (see 
Appendix A for further elaboration).  The top 3 corporations in U.S. corn control 80% 
of U.S. exports while Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta dominate the corn seed market 
(Monsanto holds 41% of global corn seed market).51  Likewise, the global sugarcane 
industry is highly concentrated amongst Cargill, Louis Dreyfus, and Cosan.  In 
addition, only a handful of corporations, including Wilmar, IOI, Synergy Drive, and 
Cargill, dominate the palm oil industry.  Bunge, ADM, Cargill, and Dreyfus dominate 
the global soy trade, and Monsanto and Dupont own a disproportionate share of the 
global soy seed market (see GRAIN 2007, 2008b).  As the main input, storage, and 
transportation industries, these corporations exert monopolistic control and collect 
                                                
50 First generation agrofuels refer to existing agricultural crops, including sugar cane, soy, corn, palm 
oil, and jatropha.  Second generation agrofuels, also referred to as cellulosic ethanol, refer to the 
conversion of cellulosic material such as grasses, trees, algae, and crop residues into fuel. Currently, 
biotechnology companies are decoding the genetic information of first and second generation agrofuel 
crops in an attempt to create plants that are more readily convertible to fuel (Shattuck 2008). 
51 As a result of the structural dynamics of grain markets, when corn prices reached record levels in 
2008 farmer income in the U.S. did not parallel the rise of commodity prices (IATP 2008). 
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profits at both ends of the commodity chain.  The expansion of global agrofuel 
markets offer biotechnology companies new markets for agro-inputs and allow grain 
trading corporations to hedge agricultural commodities between food, fuel, or other 
industrial markets.  Advances in genetic engineering and new markets for agro-
industrial products facilitate the corporate project of extending commodity relations, 
opening avenues for capital accumulation, and concentrating power within input and 
output commodity chains.  As such, corporate agrofuel projects express the dominant 
historical logic of the subordination of agriculture to capital in the form of agro-
industrialization, deepening the metabolic rift between society and nature.  
Since the viability of many agrofuel feedstocks is contingent on biotechnology 
breakthroughs, agrofuel projects have revitalized the push to genetically engineer 
crops.  Established seed corporations, such as Monsanto, Syngenta, Dupont, Bayer, 
Dow, and BASF are receiving the largest investments for research and development 
for agrofuel crops.  Currently there are two ways biotechnology is being used for 
agrofuel development: 1) to increase yields and oil content of first generation feed 
stocks, and 2) the development of cellulosic, or ‘second generation’, ethanol (Holt-
Giménez and Shattuck 2009).  Of the four main first generation commercial agrofuels 
(corn, soy, sugar cane, and palm oil), corn, soy and sugar cane have already been 
genetically engineered to withstand Monsanto’s round up ready herbicide, and 
Synthetic Genomics corporation is currently developing commercially viable 
genetically modified palm oil (GRAIN 2007).  The characteristics for genetically 
engineering first generation agrofuels are predominantly to increase yields or oil 
content of plants, alter ethanol refinery byproducts so it can be used as livestock feed, 
to engineer pesticide resistant seed varieties, or to genetically alter plants to withstand 
abiotic factors such as drought, salinity, and other poor soil features (for the purpose 
of growing energy crops on marginal lands) (Ibid).  Renessen, for example, is a joint 
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venture between Cargill and Monsanto that developed Mavera corn seed that includes 
transgenes to produce higher oil content for ethanol refining as well as lysine, an 
essential amino acid, for livestock feed (Shattuck 2008).  Mavera corn, produced by 
Cargill and Monsanto, demonstrates how agribusiness is creating closed loop 
corporate systems in which agribusiness sells agro-inputs to farmers, purchases the 
harvest for industrial transformation into ethanol and then meat.  By genetically 
engineering abiotic tolerant seeds, genetically engineered agrofuels expand the 
territorial range of agribusiness into ‘so called’ marginal lands.  Either through the 
appropriation of common or public lands, termed marginal, or by incorporating 
marginalized smallholder farmers into corporate supply chains, genetically engineered 
agrofuels displace or subordinate smallholder farmers (Cotula, Dyer, and Vermeulen 
2008).  Since, resource poor farmers and indigenous communities often utilize so-
called marginal lands to meet their livelihood needs, the framing of ‘marginality’ in 
both the WDR and corporate discourse obscures the corporate appropriation of 
agriculture, and the subordination of the ecological and social valuation systems of the 
poor to economistic calculus (Martinez-Alier 2002).  
Capital investments by oil, automobile, and agribusiness corporations are also 
going towards public-private partnerships for the research and development of 
genetically engineered agrofuel crops.  Oil corporations are one of the primary 
investors in research and development of genetically engineered fuel crops, tightening 
the relationship between energy and agribusiness industries through collaborative 
projects.52  Some of the world’s largest oil corporations are collaborating to fund 
                                                
52 Once antagonistic towards ethanol production, Big Oil companies are now heavily investing in the 
production and processing of agrofuels (Krauss, NY Times, March 26, 2009).  Brent Erickson, the 
executive VP Biotechnology Industry Organization told the New York Times, “[a]ny time you get Big 
Oil into the game, that changes the paradigm because nobody can go large scale chemical engineering 
like Big Oil” (2009: 1).  In other words, the financial support of oil corporations provides the capital 
base to propel a full scale research and development program for agrofuels.  For example, British 
Petroleum (BP) has invested $1.5 billion on agrofuel, joining with small start up companies, and also 
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research agendas in public universities, including a $500 million grant from BP to UC 
Berkeley, a $22.5 million agrofuel research program at Iowa State University funded 
by Conoco Phillips, and research alliances between Chevron and UC Davis as well as 
the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory.  Both Royal 
Dutch Shell and Total are teaming up with biotech and automobile companies to 
research second generation feed stocks (Padilla 2007).  These public-private research 
partnerships continue what Kloppenburg (2004) calls the commodification of 
knowledge and scientific methods through the commercialization of academia (or 
privatized research agenda).  In doing so, capital influences the scientific agenda and 
process, and ultimately, appropriates the products of research.  While private 
companies invest in market-oriented product research, universities orient their 
research agendas toward commercially relevant products in order to secure corporate 
financing.  This relationship supports business interests at the expense of other 
intellectual endeavors, such as small-scale agroecological research.53  In the case of 
genetic engineering, the appropriation of public universities by private industry 
subsidizes and perpetuates the agro-industrial development model, by developing 
technological interventions that allow agribusiness to appropriate or substitute social 
and ecological production processes (Bollier 2002).  Accordingly, the expansion of 
corporate agrofuel projects is providing biotechnology companies large investments 
for the development of new seed varieties and an opportunity to open new markets for 
these seeds.  
                                                                                                                                       
large agrochemical companies such as Dupont.  Shell has quadrupled its agrofuel research funding since 
2007, Chevron has entered into a number of joint ventures in agrofuel projects, and Valero is busy 
buying corn ethanol refineries (Krauss, NY Times, March 26, 2009).  Other national and private oil 
companies are investing in agrofuel projects including, Eni, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Repsol, Titan, Lukoil, 
Petrobrás (of Brazil), Total, PetroChina, Bharat Petroleum, PT Medco, and Gulf Oil.  
53 Thus, knowledge production increasingly takes the form of commodity production in which 
universities embrace “an atomized, market-based approach to knowledge production” adhering to 
‘market’ signals and the profit motive (Kloppenburg 2004: 332). 
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With potentially large financial returns, biotechnology companies are attempting 
to create commercially viable cellulosic, or ‘second generation,’ agrofuel feedstocks.  
The current refining of cellulosic ethanol is energy intensive and capital intensive, and 
thus, second generation agrofuels are not commercially competitive with fossil fuel 
energy or first generation agrofuels.  Biological barriers to breaking down lignin into 
starch prevent the easy transformation of cellulose into fuel.  For example, research is 
under way to genetically engineer trees and grasses for lower lignin levels to facilitate 
the biomass to fuel conversion process (Shattuck 2008).  Likewise, fungi and enzymes 
are being genetically engineered to breakdown lignin so that these fungi and enzymes 
can digest crop residues or other plant materials in fuel production process (Smolker, 
Tokar, and Petermann 2008).  As such, the rapid investment in second generation 
agrofuels, including large investments from oil, agribusiness, automobile and airline 
industries, and through government subsides and grants in the US and EU is spurring a 
new wave of genetic enclosures, which threatens to expand the commodification of 
life to any living plant species (including grasses, algae, trees, crop residues, and other 
plants).   
The processes of commodification and the expansion of market relations, 
according to Polanyi, were the defining characteristics of the capitalist project of 
disembedding markets from society.  Fictitious commodities, Polanyi argued, 
embodied the central contradiction of free market capitalism, as nature (as well as 
labor and money), are not commodities produced for markets, but are fundamental to 
the social and ecological fabric of society.  “Production is interaction of man and 
nature;” he explains, “if this process is to be organized through a self-regulating 
mechanism of barter and exchange, then man and nature must be brought into its orbit; 
they must be subject to supply and demand, that is, be dealt with as commodities, as 
goods produced for sale” (Polanyi 2001: 136).  Importantly, the process of 
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commodification drives and deepens the metabolic rift between society and nature.  
The commodification of nature and the socio-ecological relations of production 
subordinates and transforms natural processes (nutrient, water, and energy cycles) to 
conform to the spatial and temporal features of capitalist accumulation.   
Situated in a historical moment characterized by the specter of irreversible climate 
change and widespread global hunger, emerging corporate food and fuel complexes 
expose and crystallize the central contradictions of ‘green’ neoliberal development 
discourse and practice.  Far from mitigating climate change and supporting agrarian 
development, green capitalism via the food and fuel complex recycles fundamental 
problems as solutions, reproducing the negative socio-ecological consequences of 
agro-industrialization.  Growing agribusiness profit margins, increasing corporate 
concentration within agro-input and grain markets, and the growing corporate 
alliances and capital base undergirding biotechnology research and development for 
agrofuel feedstocks demonstrates the tightening corporate control over global food and 
fuel systems (GRAIN 2007).54  Describing the dynamics of an emerging global food 
system a decade ago, Friedmann argued, 
 
Within the limits of international rules, corporate integration of a global 
agrofood sector has proceeded as quickly and thoroughly as changing 
technologies permit.  A new degree of global sourcing is made possible 
by feedstuffs that substitute the standard corn and soy combination of 
the food regime… Rapacious entrepreneurial practices are encouraged 
by slavish state policies to attract investments and promote exports.  
The paradise of eternal strawberries and ornamental plants for rich 
consumers depends on an underworld of social disruption and 
ecological responsibility (1993: 53-54). 
As illustrated in the case of corporate agrofuel projects, biotechnology companies 
and agribusinesses are capitalizing on development policies and discourse that support 
                                                
54 As grain and agro-input corporations consolidate within global food and fuel markets, these 
corporations dictate prices at the farm gate and retail ends of the supply chain (Heffernan 2000; Murphy 
2008).  As a result, when commodity prices spiked in 2008, Cargill’s profits spiked 67% from the 
previous year, Bunge increased its profits in the first half of 2008 by 471%, and Monsanto’s income 
was up by 83% during the first three quarters of 2008 (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2009). 
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increasing corporate manipulation and control of global food and fuel systems.  
Premised along the lines of the WDR’s marketized conception of multifunctionality, 
agrofuel projects demonstrate the ways in which corporate conglomerates are utilizing 
genetically engineered seeds and vertically and horizontally integrated supply chains 
to manage climate, food, and energy security on a global scale.  As such, the WDR’s 
objectives of meeting sustainability development goals and economic growth express 
the subordination of environmental goals to capital accumulation, or new forms of 
‘green accumulation’ (Goldman 2005).   
The implication of both the discursive framings of the WDR and material practices 
of the corporate food regime via agrofuel projects is deepening a global metabolic rift 
of agro-industrialization.  In reproducing the agro-industrial model and market-based 
approaches to development, the WDR’s vision of sustainable and multifunctional 
agriculture, and its material manifestations, encourages the processes that cause 
ecological degradation.  “The greening of the Bank,” Goldman explains, “has only 
intensified the colonial gaze with which the North views the South, and which has 
recently come to rest on the environment and those who depend on it most directly as 
a source of sustenance, broadly defined” (2005: 150).  The Bank devalues local 
agricultural traditions and agroecological practices, in favor of capital-intensive 
agricultural development.  Even though agroecological production is more resilient to 
environmental stressors, the Bank prefers corporate led strategies.  By encouraging the 
integration of smallholder farmers into corporate value chains, the WDR’s agriculture 
for development sanctions depeasantization.55 
However, in the face of development contradictions and the social and 
ecological entropy of the corporate food regime, a transnational counter-movement is 
strengthening around alternative conceptions of agricultural multifunctionality and a 
                                                
55 See Appendix A for a case study of the corporate palm oil complex in Southeast Asia. 
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new agenda for development premised on the centrality of smallholder agriculture.  
The epistemic challenge posed within dominant development discourse by the 
IAASTD, at this historical conjuncture of multiple reinforcing social and ecological 
crises, is unsettling the legitimacy of the agro-industrial model, and providing a 
window of opportunity for agrarian social movements to consolidate and establish the 
principles of food sovereignty as the basis for agrarian reform.   
 
THE IAASTD, LA VIA CAMPESINA, AND FOOD AND FUEL SOVEREIGNTY  
 
Food is a basic human right.  This right can only be realized in a 
system where food sovereignty is guaranteed.  Food sovereignty is the 
right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to 
produce its basic food respecting cultural and productive diversity.  We 
have the right to produce our own food in our own territory.  Food 
sovereignty is a precondition to genuine food security (Via Campesina, 
1996; quoted in Desmarais 2002: 104). 
 
In contrast to the WDR and corporate agrofuel projects, the IAASTD framings, 
interpretations, and solutions based on agroecology, smallholders, and local control of 
food systems, open a discursive space for the food sovereignty movement, as 
represented by the political interventions of La Via Campesina, to establish 
development alternatives premised on the centrality of peasant agroecological 
practices and knowledges.  Boaventura de Sousa Santos and A. Rodriguez-Garavito 
explain that the idea of alternative development, “proposes that limits be set [on 
economic growth] and that such growth be subordinated to non-economic 
imperatives” (2006: xxxiv).  Social movements, organizations, and other groups 
struggling for development alternatives, according to these authors, place principles of 
equity, environmental sustainability, and community-control at the center of economic 
organization and forms of production.  As such, struggles for alternative development 
can manifest in a multiplicity of forms and strategies.  While the food sovereignty 
movement puts up a unified resistance to corporate-led development models, it also 
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embodies the diversified and multilayered struggle for development alternatives as 
peasant groups and organizations, which constitute the food sovereignty movement, 
express a diverse range of culturally and geographically specific forms of production, 
knowledges, and practices.  
The opening quote in this section by La Via Campesina (a transnational federation 
of peasant organizations) is an early articulation of food sovereignty presented at the 
1996 World Food Summit.  In this articulation, food sovereignty implies “the right of 
each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic food 
respecting cultural and productive diversity” (Desmarais 2002: 104).  However, 
subsequent articulations of food sovereignty move beyond the national focus and 
encompass a wide range of rights-based claims from the community/local level to 
regional level, including the right to land, farming, and self-determination (Patel 
2005). 
At the core of the concept is the re-prioritizing and redefining of agricultural 
development policies in order to elevate social and environmental concerns above 
trade and market liberalization.  Within this frame, peasant movements are calling for 
the removal of agriculture from international trade agreements and WTO rules (Rosset 
2006).  Although the food sovereignty movement does not reject markets, it prioritizes 
local markets to global markets, rejecting the neoliberal paradigm in which 
corporations dictate prices.  Furthermore, the food sovereignty movement subordinates 
market relations to socio-ecological relations.  As such, the food sovereignty 
movement calls on local, national, and international policy makers to protect 
agricultural and food systems from external pressures as well as to democratize policy 
decisions regarding food and agriculture.  These demands include, “dismantling of 
agribusiness companies” who are appropriating smallholder lands and “creating 
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environmental disasters…banning all forms of genetic use restriction technologies,” 
and banning subsidies that promote agricultural dumping (Via Campesina 2009: 10). 
There is no universal application or blueprint for an agricultural policy based on 
the concept of food sovereignty because such policies are contextually specific and 
vary depending on the geographic, historical, and cultural context in which food and 
agricultural policies are negotiated.  Nonetheless, food sovereignty is partially 
premised on decentralizing and democratizing agrarian policy decisions, redistributive 
land reform, protection from unfair trade regimes, and support of smallholder and 
indigenous knowledges.56  In order to realize food sovereignty and address 
contemporary social and ecological crises, La Via Campesina argues,  
 
The necessary forms of organizing and carrying out these forms of 
agriculture require decentralized tasks and millions of people, 
communities and organizations involved and making decisions on how 
to make the change possible.  They require a sharp knowledge of local 
ecosystems and conditions, of seeds and biodiversity.  Only small 
farmers and indigenous peoples around the world can fulfill such needs 
(La Via Campesina 2009: 18). 
 
In particular, redistributive land reform is stressed as an important step in reversing 
the trends of land concentration and privatization (in both the colonial and neoliberal 
eras) and in supporting rural livelihoods and food security (Rosset, Patel, and Corville 
2006).  For example, Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement (MST) is the largest 
member organization in La Via Campesina and has successfully fought for the 
permanent settlement of over 350,000 landless families (Wright and Wolford 2003).  
Accordingly, La Via Campesina claims that true agrarian reform “strengthens small-
                                                
56 According to Rosset (2006) food sovereignty entails a common set of preconditions in order to 
achieve a just, cultural appropriate and ecologically sustainable agriculture.  Firstly, agriculture and 
food must be taken out of the WTO and the logic of free market capitalism (Ibid).  Second, land reform 
must be implemented to redress historical inequalities in access to land.  Third, agriculturalists, fisher-
folk, pastoralists, and rural communities have the right, through democratic processes, to determine 
what type of food system is appropriate for them.  Fourth, states must protect against agricultural 
dumping, and must privilege local, national, and regional markets over export first models of 
development.  Fifth, states must protect and support indigenous and traditional agricultural knowledge 
(Ibid). 
87 
scale farming, promotes the production of food as the primary use of land, and regards 
food as a basic human right that should not be treated as a commodity” (2009: 7).  As 
articulated in this passage, La Via Campesina and the principles of agrarian reform 
based on food sovereignty, reflect the social protective movement of Polanyi’s double 
movement.  The principles of food sovereignty counter corporate attempts to privatize 
the means of production and commodify food.   
La Via Campesina and the principles of food sovereignty draw attention to and 
attempt to address historically constructed inequalities.  With food as its point of 
political intervention, the food sovereignty movement is redefining modernity and 
development from below.  According to Escobar, 
 
Social movements constitute an analytical and political terrain in which 
the weakening of development and the displacement of certain 
categories of modernity (for example, progress and the economy) can 
be defined and explored.  It is in terms of social movement discourse 
that the immediacy of “development,” and its foundational role in the 
constitution of the “Third World” and the post-World War II 
international economic order, can be more pertinently put to rest (1992: 
28). 
Accordingly, the discursive and political interventions of the food sovereignty 
movement open up the possibility of a world not based on goals of hyper-economic 
growth, privatization, consumerism, and corporate governance, but of an agriculture 
based on the public good as defined through ‘truly participatory’ democratic 
processes.  In contrast to dominant development narratives that frame peasant 
agriculture as a historical relic, unproductive, and a barrier to economic growth, the 
food sovereignty movement politicizes modernist discourse and appropriates and 
reconstitutes the meaning of peasant agriculture as agent of an alternative and 
sustainable modernity.  Opposed to framing peasants as the culprits of social and 
ecological crises (as the WDR implies), the food sovereignty movement frames 
peasants as the saviors to the social and ecological crises.  As La Via Campesina 
88 
argues “the solutions to the current crisis have to emerge from organized social actors 
that are developing modes of production, trade and consumption based on justice, 
solidarity and healthy communities.  No technological fix will solve the current global 
environmental and social disaster” (2009: 7).  
The food sovereignty movement promotes agroecological knowledge and practices 
of smallholders as a way to address contemporary ecological crises.  The growing 
body of literature on agroecology, traditional agricultural practices, and sustainable 
production methods, support the claims made by the food sovereignty movement, as it 
is increasingly evident that small- to medium-scale farms that incorporate ecological 
management techniques can produce as much food as industrial monoculture 
agriculture, conserve agro-biodiversity and natural resources, and are more resilient to 
climatic and market variability (Gliessman 2000; Altieri 1995; Vandermeer and 
Perfecto 2005; Pretty 2002; Rosset 2000; Holt-Gimenez 2006; Netting 1993). In a 
recent study, researchers at the University of Michigan argue that organic production 
techniques can produce as much food as large-scale monocultures, and without 
expanding the current land acreage under production can feed the current global 
population (Chappell 2007).  As a comprehensive study of the effects of hurricane 
Mitch on conventional and small-scale agroecological farms in Central America 
demonstrated, farmers that implement agroecological management on their farms are 
also more resilient to environmental stress and market fluctuations (Holt-Gimenez 
2006; Altieri 1995).  Traditional agricultural systems and agroecological practices 
restore soil fertility by recycling on farm nutrients, store carbon by increasing organic 
matter, require less water, conserve agro-biodiversity, and are less chemical and 
energy intensive (Altieri 1995; Gliessman 2000; Pimentel 2009b; Mayozer and 
Roudart 2006; Pretty 2006). 
In arguing for the dismantlement of neoliberal trade regimes and corporate power 
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and by repositioning smallholder, traditional, and indigenous knowledge at the center 
of sustainable development alternatives, the food sovereignty movement poses an 
epistemic challenge to the theoretical and political claims of the disappearance and 
political insignificance of peasant agriculture (reflected in both development discourse 
and scholarly debates on the ‘fate of the peasantry’).  As McMichael argues, food 
sovereignty is both a critique of modernist and orthodox Marxist representations and 
of neoliberal development policies that frame peasant farmers as anachronisms (2008).  
Epistemic challenges within development discourse revolving around the deepening 
ecological crises of agro-industrialization amplify the contestations from agrarian 
social movements who are forcing the social and ecological importance of smallholder 
agriculture to the center of contemporary debates on agrarian change.  In light of the 
mounting global ecological footprint of industrial agriculture, and a growing counter-
movement premised on the principles of food sovereignty and agroecology, the 
epistemic lens and the original political problematics articulated in agrarian question 
debates must be revisited with a more central socio-ecological lens. 
 
A POLITICS OF EMERGENCE AND THE “NEW” AGRARIAN QUESTION 
Conflicting Epistemes and Struggles for Development Alternatives: Peasants as 
Savior or Culprit? 
In a time of multiple crises, the epistemic tensions in the WDR and IAASTD 
reflect the tenuousness and fragility of the agro-industrial model and a challenge to 
economistic valuation within dominant development discourse.  Growing skepticism 
around market-led agricultural practices is creating space for alternative 
conceptualizations and framings of food, energy, and climate crises and the role of 
agriculture therein.  Discussing changes in food regimes, Friedmann explains periods 
of transition as “periods of unresolved experimentation and contestation” including 
tensions and contestations within the “ideological and discursive aspects” of 
90 
institutional arrangements governing food systems (2009: 335).  She argues that 
“transitional eras are full of multiple possibilities” in which social movements, or 
other groups or organizations “name” and “offer competing frames for resolving” the 
contradictions of the “delegitimized food regime” (2009: 336).  Accordingly, the 
cracks and fissures within dominant development discourse offer an opportunity for a 
politics of emergence, whereby social movements advocating food and fuel 
sovereignty can consolidate as viable development alternatives.  The political 
implications of this historical conjuncture expressed by a contemporary double 
movement of corporate disembedding and a food sovereignty countermovement are 
also reshaping agrarian question debates.  This final section examines the shifting 
political terrain and content of the contemporary agrarian question in light of the 
cracks and fissures in development discourse and a politics of emergence where food 
sovereignty movements are reconstituting peasant agriculture as development 
alternatives. 
As argued here, the ‘fate of the peasantry’ is not only a problematic of the 
capital/labor relation, but also an epistemic and ecological problematic; rather than 
focusing on capital’s reconstitution of the peasantry via full or partial 
proletarianization, contemporary agrarian movements are reframing the debate around 
the social and ecological benefits of smallholder agriculture.  In politicizing the socio-
ecological entropy of the agro-industrial model (which erodes the material basis of 
social and ecological reproduction), La Via Campesina employs the concept of food 
sovereignty as a discursive and political intervention into the dominant market-based 
framings of food security and as a way to revalorize peasant knowledges and 
agroecological practices necessary for meeting contemporary social and ecological 
crises.57  Situating food sovereignty as a founding principle for development 
                                                
57 La Via Campesina argues, “Corporate food production and consumption are significantly 
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alternatives to the agro-industrial model, movements such as La Via Campesina 
redefine development.  Importantly, the food sovereignty movement poses an 
epistemic challenge to the agrarian question of capital by discursively reconstituting 
peasantries from marginality to centrality in development discourse, and situating 
peasant as the agents for building just and sustainable food systems (McMichael 2006, 
2009e).  By re-appropriating the category of peasant as a way to revalue smallholder 
agriculture and politicize theoretical and political representations of peasants, the 
emergence of La Via Campesina and the food sovereignty movement signifies a 
reclamation of peasant subjectivity from theoretical and political claims of peasant 
disintegration and political insignificance (McMichael 2008). 
 
Sketching Agrarian Question Debates: The Politics of Agrarian Transformation from 
Primitive Accumulation to Globalization58 
According to Bernstein, debates on agrarian transformations and transitions to 
capitalist agriculture, known as the agrarian question, have traditionally looked at 
three problematics: 1) “agricultural production, or, what constitutes a transition to 
capitalist agriculture and what drives it,” 2) “contemporary politics, or what is the role 
of agrarian classes of labor in struggles for democracy or socialism,” and 3) “industrial 
                                                                                                                                       
contributing to global warming and to the destruction of rural communities.  Intercontinental food 
transport, intensive monoculture production, land and forest destruction and the use of chemical inputs 
in agriculture are transforming agriculture into an energy consumer and are contributing to climate 
change.  Under neo-liberal policies imposed by the WTO, the regional and bilateral FTAs, as well as 
the World Bank and the IMF, food is produced with oil-based pesticides and fertilizers and transported 
all around the world for transformation and consumption.  Via Campesina, a movement bringing 
together millions of small farmers and producers around the World, asserts that it is time to radically 
change the industrial way to produce, transform, trade and consume food and agricultural products.  We 
believe that sustainable small-scale farming and local food consumption will reverse the actual 
devastation and support millions of farming families.  Agriculture can also contribute to cool down the 
earth by using farm practices that store CO2 and reduce considerably the use of energy on farms” 
(2009: 2-3). 
58 The point of this section is to highlight some of the central debates in the agrarian question literature.  
In attempting to summarize the debates in just a few pages, this sketch obviously misses many of the 
rich details for the purpose of distilling central points of contention.  For a thorough discussion of the 
agrarian question see Akram-lodhi and Kay 2009.    
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accumulation, or how transitions to capitalist agriculture contribute to the capital 
accumulation necessary for industrial development” (2009: 240-241).  Central 
amongst these questions are the structural dynamics of capitalist development and the 
political tensions that arise from capitalist transitions.  As will be explored below, 
these overly structured analyses within agrarian question literature obscure the socio-
ecological relations and valuation systems outside of or marginal to capitalist relations 
(McMichael 2009e).  In addition, the neglect of ecological relations limit the 
applicability of the 19th century and subsequent framings of the agrarian question to 
the contemporary moment in which food, energy, and climate crises, and the political 
mobilizations around these crises, are unsettling the foundations of the agroindustrial 
model and altering the temporal and spatial assumptions of development and 
modernity.  
Both modernization and (orthodox) Marxist development theories presupposed the 
displacement or disintegration of small-scale family farms or peasant agriculture on 
the path to industrial modernity.  In the face of capitalist competition and laissez-faire 
economic policies (first, within a national context, and later, within a global context), 
the processes of rural class differentiation and land consolidation were theoretically 
assumed to disintegrate peasant agriculture, freeing labor from the countryside for 
urban industrialization.59  Investigating this presupposed process of proletarianization 
and its consequent demographic shift, Engels also postulated the ‘peasant question’ in 
which he questioned the political allegiance of displaced peasantries in the making of 
                                                
59 Marx argued that the peasantry in Europe would eventually join the growing ranks of the industrial 
proletariat due to the contradiction between capitalist modes of production (and development) and 
peasant agriculture (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009, Kautsky 1988).  Using the concept of ‘primitive 
accumulation,’ Marx illustrated the violent nature of peasant dispossession in the restructuring of the 
English countryside.  From this capital-labor relationship, both Kautsky and Lenin also theorized a 
general trend of concentration of production in agriculture such that the peasantry would be subsumed 
into one of two rural classes: capitalist farmers or petty commodity producers.  
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revolutionary class struggles.60  Kautsky reformulated this political problematic 
focusing on the price of food as a point of political tension between peasants and 
proletariats and an obstacle to forming socialist or social democratic alliances 
(McMichael 1997).61  Thus, in the context of the 19th century, the classical agrarian 
question was a political problematic and a problematic of industrial development, both 
of which had implications for the persistence or disappearance of peasantries.62 
For both Kautsky and Lenin, the degree and scale of capitalist development and 
peasant disintegration in the countryside were historically contingent and context-
specific (within national boundaries), but nonetheless present as a general law of 
capitalist development.63  Russian populists, however, argued that the peasantry would 
persist in capitalist society, because the logic of peasant household production could 
resist and/or adapt to capitalist pressures (Chayanov 1986).64  According to Araghi, 
Chayanov argued “[t]he peasant mode of production was diametrically opposed to 
                                                
60 Engels articulated an agrarian question of labor in which he argued that the path to (working class) 
political power was through the alliance of urban labor and agrarian labor. 
61 Since peasant farmers benefited from high food prices (increased income) at the detriment of the 
working classes (increased cost of living), food prices, according to Kautsky, were an obstacle to the 
social democratic movement and revolutionary movements. 
62 I.e., to what extent is the peasantry a revolutionary force in the transition to socialism or democracy?  
As well as, how is the peasantry integrated into process of industrialization, and what is the transition 
within the agrarian sector? 
63 Although Kautsky envisioned the general trend of peasant displacement via capital accumulation, he 
also theorized a functional dualism between peasant agriculture and capitalist agriculture in which the 
peasantry (or family farms) were sites of labor (re)production for capitalist enterprise.  Thus, Kautsky 
believed that capitalist development would not completely subsume family farms, but relegate them to 
marginal and auxiliary roles within industrialization.  While Lenin did not articulate the functional 
dualist perspective of Kautsky, he argued that capitalist industrialization via technological 
advancements of production and the competitive forces lead to the disintegration of the Russian 
peasantry via processes of agrarian class differentiation (including proletarianization in which 
marginalized peasants were forced off the land into labor reserves).  Lenin saw this rural transformation 
(the commodification of agricultural production and labor and the differentiation of the peasantry) as a 
necessary process for industrialization and for the formation of a revolutionary class (1964). 
64 Using Marx’s concept of modes of production, Chayanov argued for a uniquely ‘peasant mode of 
production’ (Araghi 2009).  Whereas capitalist farming was based on the logic of accumulation, peasant 
agriculture was based on ‘subsistence and leisure.’  The consumption needs of family farmers were thus 
more flexible and resilient to market fluctuations than those of capitalist farmers.  In times of stress 
peasant farmers could “over-exploit” family labor, adjust production methods, or reduce consumption 
needs.   
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capitalist modes of production” in that peasants were not fully market dependent and 
were not subject to profit imperatives (2009: 116).  Accordingly, many of the early 
debates on the agrarian question revolved around teleological assumptions of national 
industrial development and the disintegration or persistence of peasant agriculture. 
More recent applications of the agrarian question in ‘third world’ contexts 
(Goodman and Redclift 1981, de Janvry 1981)65 continue to revolve around the 
original debates of how capitalist transformation of the peasantry (and national 
capitalist transitions) under pressures of international and national capital 
accumulation either lead to the relative persistence or the likely disappearance of the 
peasantry (Bernstein 2001).66  Problematically, these adaptations, according to Araghi, 
changed the “political peasant question into a developmentalist peasant question” such 
that it reproduced teleological theoretical assumptions of the original agrarian question 
(2009: 118).67  Additionally, contemporary critiques of the original agrarian question 
challenge the determinist, evolutionist, and teleological assumptions of both the 
disappearance and permanence of the peasantry, as well as the nation state framing of 
the agrarian question (McMichael 2009e, Bernstein 2009, Araghi 2009).68  The work 
of Friedmann (1978) provides an early challenge to the path dependent assumptions 
                                                
65 In the 1980s, the agrarian question was revisited in light of underdevelopment and dependency 
theories and applied to ‘Third World’ contexts (Goodman and Redclift 1981; de Janvry 1981), 
investigating the ways in which colonial restructuring and the imposition of international unequal terms 
of trade led to varying trajectories of proletarianization via peasant displacement/disintegration in 
‘underdeveloped’ countries (de Janvry 1981). 
66 Since the demographics of the Global South were still predominantly rural and agrarian-based, 
Marxist interpretations tended to investigate the particular barriers to capitalist accumulation in 
agriculture or the functional relations of peasants and capital.  Neo-populists, however, employed 
empirical demographic evidence to maintain their theoretical position (Araghi 2009). 
67 Although the introduction of dependency and underdevelopment theories highlighted some of the 
limitations of the original debates, that is the relations of international capital and dynamics of capital 
accumulation and exploitation between core and periphery in the historical context of colonial 
restructuring, the theoretical intervention remained within the capital/labor framing and national 
development context of the original agrarian question (Araghi 2009). 
68 The agrarian question was framed in a nation state framework that overlooked global developments 
in capitalism, the changing relationships between international markets, states and peasants, as well as 
new forms of transnational resistance (McMichael 1997, 2009e).  Furthermore, the 
permanence/disappearance debate instigated a definitional problem: what constitutes a peasantry? 
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latent in early agrarian question debates.  By detailing the historical contingencies that 
created conditions for family wheat farmers in the North American frontier to place 
competitive pressures on wheat farmers in Germany (including capitalist enterprises), 
Friedmann’s research on North American frontier wheat farmers drew attention to 
world historical processes (including the creation of a single-price mechanism, which 
facilitated global competition) that complicated the over-reliance on capital 
accumulation as the central explanatory device in agrarian change.69 In elucidating the 
historical conditions that allowed family farmers to compete within international 
markets, Friedmann’s analysis challenged the ‘path dependent’ assumptions of the 
classical agrarian question and transcended the state-centrism of the earlier 
formulations of the agrarian question. 
While contemporary debates on agrarian transformations have splintered in 
multiple new and divergent directions (at least six different reformulations, according 
to Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009)70, some articulations of the contemporary agrarian 
                                                
69 The single-price mechanism facilitated a global commodity competition between capitalist 
agriculture and family farm units in agrarian frontiers, and the relative advantages of these varying 
approaches was contingent upon state policies and geographical conditions that limited or gave 
opportunities for expanded production.  In this case, frontier family wheat farms in the American West 
were able to ‘persist’ at the expense of European (capitalist) farmers, placing pressure through the price 
mechanism of international markets. 
70 Akram-Lodhi and Kay distinguish six strands of contemporary agrarian questions in a current edited 
volume titled Peasants and Globalization (2009: 22-27).  First, the path dependent agrarian question, 
which is in part a continuation of the classical debate over the inevitable, albeit varied, capitalist 
agrarian transformation (agricultural commercialization and labor commodification) as applied to the 
post-colonial world.  Second, the global reserve army of labor agrarian question, which stems from a 
world-historical perspective in which continuities are drawn between the colonial period and 
contemporary globalization, highlighting the imperialist rearrangement of a global division of labor.  
Third, the agrarian question of class forces, which argues that ‘agrarian transitions’ are always 
contingent upon the dynamics and structures of class relations.  Fourth, the decoupled agrarian question 
of labor, which emphasizes the predominance of transnational capital that has ‘decoupled’ national 
capital from national labor.  Accordingly, this approach assumes that the agrarian question of capital 
has been resolved, leaving unresolved the agrarian question of labor (Bernstein 2009).  Fifth, pulling on 
aspects of all the aforementioned discussions, the gendered agrarian question argues that any full 
understanding of agrarian change must incorporate both the contradictions of class and gender relations.  
Sixth, the agrarian question of food shifts the analytic focus from capital to food as an embodiment of 
the relations of production and circulation in historical context.  In doing so, the agrarian question of 
food politicizes the current corporate food regime. 
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question remain overly reliant on the parameters of the original agrarian question, 
specifically on the capital/labor lens (see for example Bernstein 1996, 2001, 2009).  
According to McMichael (2008) formulating a ‘new agrarian question’ must deal with 
the limits of the original debates as well as the current neoliberal historical context and 
its contestations.  In formulating a new agrarian question McMichael argues,  
 
First, peasant trajectories are conditioned by world, rather than 
national, history.  Second, as an instrument of legitimacy, the 
development narrative’s enabling of an intensified peasant 
dispossession under a virulent neoliberal regime has become the focal 
point of a contemporary peasant mobilization.  Third, conventional 
(liberal and Marxist) attempts to schematize modern history in 
developmentalist terms run aground on the shoals of stage theory—
democratic outcomes, nationally imagined, are as partial as 
representations of peasants as historical relics (2008: 206). 
 
In this historical context then, the agrarian question must be understood globally 
(in relation to national specificities) as transnational capital, with support from 
international institutions such as the WTO, World Bank, and IMF, has “become the 
organizing principle of the global economy” conditioning national policies and 
international development agendas (McMichael 2008: 205).  Furthermore, ecological 
crises invite a rethinking of territorial and temporal features of the agrarian question.71  
Both the perceptions and biophysical realities of global ecological crises, such as 
climate change and water shortages, present biophysical limits to the spatial and 
temporal logic of development theory and practice that presumes the continued 
separation of social reproduction (displacing peasants) from ecological cycles.  As 
such, the contemporary agrarian question, as articulated by agrarian social movements, 
is also shaped by the politics of global ecological change.  The ecological and social 
crises of agro-industrialization reflect a shifting political terrain of agrarian change and 
                                                
71 The biophysical limits as illustrated by climate change and peak oil, present clear temporal limits of 
agro-industrial model of development, premised on increasing fossil fuel consumption and spatial 
expansion.  These limitations create a backdrop for political struggles around agrarian change. 
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open a space through which transnational agrarian social movements challenge the 
dominant capital/labor framing of the agrarian question and dominant development 
narratives.  Whereas capitalist development imposes a temporal and spatial logic that 
increasingly transforms the spatial and temporal features of ecological cycles and 
bioregions, agrarian social movements are struggling to re-embed agriculture, both 
culturally and ecologically.  By rejecting corporate led development in support of 
place-based development alternatives the food sovereignty movement reflects an 
awareness of the multiple scales of political struggle.  Grounded in local and context 
specific struggles for substantive rights to land and productive resources, the food 
sovereignty movement also shifts its political focus to national (challenging 
‘privatized states’), regional (contesting free trade agreements), and global levels 
(contesting international development institutions).   
Furthermore, the emergence of transnational agrarian movements serves to re-
establish the socio-ecological significance and political subjectivity of peasant 
agriculture.  As opposed to a fixed social category locked into national development 
trajectories, the peasantry is an ever-reconstituted social group, defined via relational 
processes in varying political-economic contexts (Akhram-Lodhi and Kay 2009, Watts 
2009).  In the case of La Via Campesina and the food sovereignty movement, peasants 
are capturing this historical moment of rising skepticism towards the social and 
ecological crises of agro-industrial development strategies as an opportunity to assert 
their historical agency, redefine development, and reconstitute the categories ascribed 
by modernist and orthodox Marxist theories.   
Accordingly, the contemporary agrarian question debates mirror the epistemic and 
political points of contestations within development discourse at this historical 
conjuncture.  Competing conceptualizations of smallholder agriculture as articulated 
in a global double movement of corporate disembedding and a transnational food 
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sovereignty countermovement are provoking diverging conceptualizations of 
contemporary agrarian change in both development discourse and the agrarian 
question.  While the political and epistemic implications of dominant development 
discourse and deterministic formulations of the agrarian question reproduce the 
narrative of a disappearing and/or proletarianized peasantry, the political and 
epistemic interventions by La Via Campesina and the food sovereignty movement 
challenge this narrative and reflect new and emerging possibilities of a transnational 
countermovement in which the centrality of peasant agroecological knowledge, 
practices, and local markets can restore and protect social and ecological 
sustainability.  
In contrast to the practical politics of a Polanyian double movement resolution 
characterized by a countermovement struggling for nationalized markets (i.e. welfare 
state), the new political configurations and interventions of agrarian social movements 
and organization, which constitute La Via Campesina and the struggle for food 
sovereignty, are no longer focused on the nation state, but are multi-layered and 
reconfigured in particular places and specific contextual struggles.  While the political 
configurations of this transnational countermovement contest corporate and dominant 
development discourse and practices through international solidarity, the diverse 
historical, cultural, and political contexts of local, national, and regional resistance and 
proactive construction of development alternatives implies a multiplicity of projects 
contingent on the specificities and particularities of each situation.  Contesting 
development narratives and reclaiming the centrality of smallholder-diversified 
agriculture in sustainable development alternatives is the collective starting point for 
agrarian social movements in creating agendas for specific, diverse, and cultural and 
geographically situated agrarian reforms.  La Via Campesina argues, “Contrary to 
what authorities and agribusiness often say, small farmers are not deforesting the 
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world.  Industrial plantations are currently by far the major cause of land clearing and 
deforestation.  The world does not need more industrial monocultures; it requires 
many forms of diversified agriculture that can incorporate and cohabit with trees” (La 
Via Campesina 2009: 17).  It is through these alternative valuation systems La Via 
Campesina and the food sovereignty movement poses epistemic challenges and 
political contestations to economistic and deterministic framings in both development 
discourse and the agrarian question, opening the space for re-imagining development.  
La Via Campesina and the food sovereignty movement expose the paradox and 
contradictions of dominant development narratives in revealing that the fate of the 
peasantry is both an ecological and an epistemic dilemma, as the loss of tacit locally 
embedded knowledge built upon generations of socio-ecological ‘co-evolution’ will be 
difficult to restore and yet is necessary in mending the social and ecological crises of 
capitalist modernity. 
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APPENDIX A 
A CASE STUDY: THE PALM OIL FOOD/FUEL COMPLEX 
Palm oil is one of the major biofuel feedstocks produced in the world, along with 
sugar, corn, and soy.  Originating in central Africa, palm oil was introduced to 
Southeast Asia in the 19th century, but was not planted as monocultures until the 1960s 
in Malaysia and the 1980s in Indonesia.  Global production has increased 30 fold since 
the 1960s, with Indonesia and Malaysia accounting for 81% of production. The 
versatility of palm oil as a food additive and cosmetic ingredient drove its rapid 
expansion in the 1990s and early 2000s, such that it recently eclipsed soybean oil as 
the most consumed edible oil in the world.  Palm oil is used as a food additive 
(favored for its semi-solid consistency) and for cooking oil, and can be found in 
products such as chocolate products, cake icing, ice cream, margarine, peanut butter, 
coffee whitener, canned cream soups, sauces, baked goods, trail mix, snack foods and 
microwavable foods.  It also has industrial/chemical uses such as lubricants, 
detergents, soaps, cosmetics, makeup remover, body lotion, and sun cream.  While the 
processed food revolution propelled the initial growth of palm oil plantations, the 
opening of biofuel markets further ramped up production over the past five years.  By 
2004, the Indonesia government was planning a 43-fold expansion of its existing 6.5 
million hectares of palm oil plantations in Sumatra and Kalimantan, or a target of 
roughly 26 million hectares by 2025 (Smolker, Tokar, and Petermann 2008).  In 2006 
alone, Malaysia planted an additional 4 million hectares of palm oil (Ibid).  Bolstered 
by tax incentives, subsidies, and domestic targets, there is a massive influx of capital 
investment for South East Asian palm oil production, from private firms to national 
governments including the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Sinar Mas 
Group, Raja Garuda Mas, PT Wilmar Bioenergy, Shell, Neste Oil, Green energy 
International, BioX, Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland, as well as investments from 
China, Japan, India, Brazil and South Korea (Ibid; GRAIN 2007).  
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Nearly half (48%) of Indonesia’s land cover is tropical rainforest, containing some 
of the world’s most species-rich habitats.  Listed as one of the Conservation 
International Sundaland Hotspots, Indonesia hosts 10% of the worlds plant species, 
16% of all reptiles and amphibians, 12% of mammal species, and 17% of all bird 
species (Smolker et al 2008).  However, the rush to clear land for palm oil plantations 
has placed Indonesia as one of the fastest deforesting regions in the world.  As a result 
of released forest carbon from clearing, Indonesia is also the 3rd largest emitter of 
green house gases, following the U.S.and China, and a number of species are under 
threat of extinction, including some of the last populations of Orangutans.  Logging 
companies are also making windfall profits in their alliance with agribusiness, as they 
clear the forests before palm companies burn the residues and plant palm seedlings.  
The conversion of tropical rainforests into palm plantations is an ecological 
catastrophe.  Palm oil plantations are water-intensive landscapes and require large 
amounts of fertilizers, pesticides, and fungicides (including Syngenta’s pesticide 
paraquat dichloride which is banned in many countries including the U.S.and EU 
because of its high toxicity). An estimated 87% of deforestation between 1985 and 
2000 can be attributed to palm oil expansion in Malaysia and has escalated since the 
biofuel boom over the past 5 years. 
In terms of carbon storage, peat lands are particularly critical habitats.  Peat land is 
high in soil organic matter, which contains large amounts of carbon.  When tropical 
forests are cut, peat lands are left exposed to the sun, rain and wind, increasing rates of 
soil drying, and soil erosion.  Converting forests to agricultural plantations, thus, 
drastically reduces soil carbon storage by as much as 40% (Smolker et al 2008).  
While deforestation from logging has major negative environmental effects, the 
conversion to palm plantations has a more lasting environmental effect.  Whereas 
degraded forests, affected by logging, can re-grow, monocrop palm plantations 
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represent a more complete transformation (biological simplification) of forest ecology 
(Vandermeer and Perfecto 2005).  At best, palm plantations contain 20% of the 
biodiversity of forests (Smolker et al 2008). 
Palm plantations are also displacing indigenous people (Tauli-Corpuz 2008).  
There are around 40-45 million indigenous people in Indonesia that depend on forests 
for their livelihoods (Smolker et al 2008; Tauli-Corpuz 2008).  Appropriations of 
indigenous land have spurred conflicts, and between 1998 and 2002, 479 people were 
reported as being tortured over land conflicts, and dozens were killed (FoE).  Victoria 
Tauli-Corpuz, Chairwoman of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
recently “warned that 60 million indigenous people worldwide…are likely to be 
driven off their land and in the near future to make way for agrofuel plantations” 
(GRAIN 2007: 27).  Palm oil companies have violated customary land rights and, in 
some cases, have confiscated locally owned lands in Indonesia (Cotula, Dyer and 
Vermeulen 2008).   
The palm oil plantations in South East Asia not only reflect the shortsightedness of 
development strategies based on agrofuel projects, but also the emerging dynamics of 
the food/fuel complex.  As global biofuel demands expand new commodity markets, 
the fungibility of palm oil allows agribusiness corporations to negotiate and leverage 
multiple markets (energy, food, and other bio-products).  Likewise, Big Oil 
corporations can diversify their risk by leveraging palm oil and crude oil markets.  
Will the price of palm oil rise and fall with the price of crude oil?  If so, what does this 
tell us about the historical moment of capitalist agriculture and its social and 
ecological contradictions?  The merging of Big Oil corporations and agribusiness 
around agrofuels illustrates a further abstraction of agriculture, deepening commodity 
relations and obscuring the socio-ecological functions agriculture (the necessary 
relation between social reproduction and ecological reproduction).  It also reflects a 
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fetishised economistic valuation system that devalues local economies in favor of 
global market integration, placing export currency above cultural and ecological 
survival.  Market fetishism and export-led strategies of development institutions are 
pushing to replace indigenous-based economies, not only destroying the ecology but 
also displacing systems of knowledge that evolved from a long history of cultural 
interaction with the local ecosystems (Martinez-Alier 2002). 
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